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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
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guardian and was declaied the seller's quardian befoie a 
was given; (c) the deed was signed by the seller after she was 
declared incompetent; and (d) no judicial approval of the sale 
nor confirmation of the sale was sought by the guardian? 
2. Did Mary Jane Freebairn have the mental capacity 
to enter into a contract to sell her property to Russell Scott 
and to execute a conveyance to him? 
3. Did the sale unfairly benefit Mr. Scott as the 
dominant party to a confidential relationship? 
4. Should a constructive trust by imposed upon the 
proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale of the land he traded for 
Miss Freebairn1s property? 
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
Provisions of Former Utah Probate Code: 
§ 75-13-32. Duties of guardian of property. A 
guardian of the property must keep safely the property 
of his ward. He must not permit any unnecessary waste 
or destruction of the real property, nor make any sale 
of such property without the order of the court, but 
must, so far as it is in his power, maintain the same, 
with its buildings and appurtenances, out of the 
income or other property of the estate, an deliver it 
to the ward at the close of his guardianship in as 
good condition as he received it, natural wear and 
tear excepted* (Emphasis supplied). 
§ 75-13-33, Power to sell, mortgage and lease. Every 
guardian must manage the estate of his ward, frugally 
and without waste, and apply the income and profits 
thereof, as far as necessary, for the comfortable and 
suitable maintenance and support of the ward and his 
family, if any; and if such income and profits are 
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell, 
mortgage or lease the real estate, upon obtaining an 
order of the court therefor, as provided, and must 
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apply the proceeds thereof as far as may be necessary 
for the maintenance and support of the ward and his 
family, if any. (Emphasis supplied). 
§ 75-13-41. Sales, mortgages and leases. When a sale 
of the property a ward is necessary to maintain him or 
his family, or to maintain and educate the ward when a 
minor, or to pay the debts and expenses of 
guardianship, or when it appears to the satisfaction 
of the court that it is for the best interests of the 
estate that the real or personal property, or some 
part thereof, be sold, mortgaged or leased, the 
guardian may mortgage or lease the same, upon an order 
of the court; and the guardian without an order of 
sale and without confirmation may sell such personal 
property of the ward as is in decedent estates to be 
sold without confirmation; and the guardian without an 
order of sale, but subject to confirmation of the 
court, may sell other personal property and the real 
property of the ward. The provisions of this title 
respecting the selling, mortgaging and leasing of the 
property of decedents and the powers, duties, rights 
and obligations thereby conferring and imposed shall, 
as far as applicable, govern the selling, mortgaging 
and leasing of property under guardianship (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
§ 75-10-2. Sale to be reported to and confirmed by 
court. All sales must be reported under oath to, and 
confirmed by, the court before the title to the 
property sold passes, except as hereinafter otherwise 
provided. 
§ 75-10-3. Sales - Report and confirmation. The 
executor or administrator may sell any property of the 
estate without order of the court, at either public or 
private sale and with or without notice as he may 
determine, but must make return of such sales in all 
cases; and if directions are given in the will as to 
the mode of selling, or the particular property to be 
sold, such direction must be observed. In any case, 
no title passes unless the sale is confirmed by the 
court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
J. Russell Scott petitioned the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County on February 27, 1971 for a declaration 
that Mary Jean Freebairn was incompetent and requested 
appointment as her guardian. The petition was granted on 
March 22, 1971. In April, 1983, Miss Freebairn brought an 
action to terminate Mr. Scott's guardianship of her, for an 
accounting of sums paid to and disbursed by Mr. Scott during 
the guardianship, and for a surcharge for damages arising out 
of the wrongful disposition of her property. Mr. Le R Burton 
was named as a defendant as a person who gave a bond to ensure 
Mr. Scott's performance as guardian. After a hearing in 
October, 1983, the court removed Mr. Scott as guardian and 
required him to prepare an accounting. The court found that 
Miss Freebairn remained incompetent, however, and ordered the 
appointment of new conservators, (The enactment of the new 
Probate Code changed the applicable nomenclature). The 
Department of Social Services was appointed conservator of her 
person and substitute conservators were appointed conservators 
of her estate. 
The action for damages in the nature of a surcharge 
was set down for hearing. By order of October 28, 1987 the 
Honorable John A. Rokich approved Miss Freebairn's retention of 
counsel of record to represent the interest of her estate in 
_4_ 
this matter. The claim against Mr. Scott was the subject of a 
hearing commencing January 12, 1988. On March 11, 1988, 
Judge Rokich issued a Memorandum Decision with Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and a Final Judgment in favor of the 
defendant was entered April 29, 1988. This appeal by the 
plaintiff followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The sale of Mary Jean Freebairn1s property to 
Russell Scott is invalid as a matter of law for three reasons. 
First, Mr. Scott as Miss Freebairn's guardian, was not 
permitted to purchase property of his ward. Second, court 
approval of the sale was never obtained, and the lack of an 
order authorizing the sale invalidates it. Finally, once a 
guardian was appointed, Miss Freebairn lost the legal capacity 
to validly deed away her property, and thus the deed she gave 
to Mr. Scott was void. 
2. Even if the transactions were not invalid as a 
matter of law, they fail because Miss Freebairn lacked the 
requisite mental capacity to contract or execute a deed. The 
trial court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous 
because the judicial finding of incompetency raised, at the 
very least, a presumption of lack of capacity which was not 
rebutted by the evidence. 
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3. If the transaction is not set aside for either of 
the foregoing reasons, it should be nullified since it resulted 
from a breach of a confidential relationship. It is 
indisputable that the plaintiff and defendant were parties to a 
confidential relationship A presumption therefore arose that 
the transaction was unfair. This presumption was not rebutted 
because the evidence was overwhelming that the property was 
sold for less than its fair market value, that improper 
deductions were taken from the purchase price, and that 
Mr. Scott profited significantly by his acquisition of his 
incompetent ward's property. The very same property resold 
less than a year after the disputed transaction for more than 
twice what the plaintiff was paid. 
4. As Miss Freebairn's guardian, Mr. Scott is deemed 
to have held her property in trust, and a constructive trust 
should be imposed upon the profit he earned when he traded her 
property for another parcel and then sold that parcel at a 
profit. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Mary Jean Freebairn and defendant 
J. Russell Scott are first cousins. Their mothers were 
sisters. They both inherited real property from a common 
uncle, Samuel Russell in 1957, The property was undeveloped 
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land at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake 
County. Mr. Scott inherited approximately four hundred and 
fifty acres and Miss Freebairn, approximately sixty acres (Tr. 
4-6) . 
2. Some time in the early sixties or previously/ 
Miss Freebairn began exhibiting signs of a mental disease which 
has been variously described as paranoid schizophrenia or a 
paranoid delusional disorder (Tr. 334-335; 486). 
3. Prior to January, 1971, Miss Freebairn made the 
following assertions to Mr. Scott, which illustrate her 
disorder: 
A group of people she referred to as "the gang" or 
"the Cannon Committee" was "after her." (Tr. 55, 90). The 
group included former governor James D. Cannon and his wife, 
Elaine Cannon. (Tr. 61) She thought they were trying to "get 
her." (Tr. 55) She thought she was followed (Tr. 59) and 
spied upon. (Tr. 56) She believed that the editor of the 
Deseret News, Mr. William Smart, deliberately placed 
objectionable messages about her in the newspaper in the form 
of cartoons and other material with hidden meanings to defame 
her. (Tr. 56-57). 
Miss Freebairn told Mr. Scott that her phone was 
bugged and that there was a television camera placed in her 
bathroom through which people observed her. (Tr. 58). 
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Miss Freebairn indicated that she believed that she was 
"watched over" by Stuart Udall who flew airplanes over her home 
for her protection. (Tr, 61-62). Mr. Scott was aware that 
Miss Freebairn had written the Department of Justice, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Senator Frank Moss about 
these problems. (Tr. 60-61, 63) 
4. Miss Freebairn corresponded with a number of 
people prior to January, 1971, about these matters, and some of 
her letters were received in evidence. (Exhibit 11, Tr. 60). 
They include LDS Church authorities, law enforcement agencies, 
Mr. Cannon and Mr. Udall. In one letter she explained that 
during a two-year period from 1966 to 1968 she was required, on 
account of interference by the "Cannon Committee" to change 
dressmakers, find a new physician, a new lawyer, a new 
insurance agent, a new bank, and a new hair dresser (Ex. 11, 
P. 0000124, Tr. 60), She also explained that in February 1967, 
the Newspaper Agency Corporation had placed an industrial spy 
on the staff of "Field and Stream Magazine" in New York in 
order to force her to resign a job she had held for one month. 
(Ex, 11, Page 0000128, Tr. 60), She stated that the Newspaper 
Agency Corporation learned in November, 1967 that she was about 
to hire a New York attorney to sue them but that the Newspaper 
used cartoons of a threatening nature to let her know that she 
^8^ 
could expect "evil consequences" for doing so. (Exhibit 11, 
P.0000129/ Tr. 60). Examples of her correspondence which were 
received into evidence are included as Appendix "A". 
5. Mr. Scott was told some time prior to July 1969 
that psychiatric treatment had been recommended for 
Miss Freebairn. (Tr. 64). 
6. During the 1950's and early sixties. 
Miss Freebairn was intermittently a student at Columbia 
University in New York City, but never earned a degree, and was 
intermittently employed in the East and in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 
262-267). Her last employment in Utah was in 1960 with the BYU 
Adult Education Center. She believes she was required to leave 
that job on account of negative reports to her employer from 
her enemies at the Deseret News, and recalls that her employer 
told her, "I don't think you're going to get beyond their 
reach." (Tr. 201). 
7. Miss Freebairn's first business dealings with 
Mr. Scott -^rcurred in June and October, 1964. She told him she 
was in debt and needed to borrow money. She executed an 
agreement in June to sell Mr. Scott ten acres of her property 
which adjoined Danish Road, with an option to repurchase. The 
sales price was $3,000 an acre. In October she was in debt 
again and sold another five acres at the same price, with a 
similar option to repurchase. (Tr. 10-15). The option to 
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repurchase was extended until September, 1965 because 
Miss Freebairn believed that there were developers who wanted 
to build another Disneyland on her property. (Tr. 15-16, Tr. 
181). No one on behalf of Walt Disney ever contacted Mr. Scott 
about building another Disneyland on her property or his. 
(Tr. 16). 
8. In 1966, Mr. Scott formed the Scott Investment 
Corporation with himself as president, his wife as vice 
president and Mr. Le R Burton as secretary/treasurer. 
(Tr. 17). Mr. Burton was a realtor who represented Mr. Scott 
in various real estate transactions, and, in addition to 
serving as an officer in the Scott family corporation, had his 
own real estate office in an office building owned by 
Mr. Scott, where Mr. Scott's office was located. (Tr. 720-722). 
9. Mr. Burton handled a sale of Miss Freebairn's 
property to a Mr. Wilstead in 1967, which included a promise by 
the seller to install a water line to the property. (Tr. 
661-662). Burton, as Miss Freebairn's realtor, knew she was 
not personally able to install a water line but thought she 
would sell other property to raise the funds to do so. 
(Tr. 729). 
10. When Miss Freebairn was unable to meet her 
obligation to install the water line, she went to her brother, 
Samuel Freebairn for help. (Tr. 214-215). They entered into a 
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verbal agreement whereby Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes 
Freebairn would purchase the bulk of his sister's remaining 
property, develop the property, and pay her $3,000 per acre on 
a "lot release" basis, with a minimum annual payment of 
$7,000. The agreement was later reduced to writing and the 
property was made subject to a trust agreement with Security 
Title Company. (Ex. 32P, Tr. 213, the trust agreement is 
attached hereto as Appendix "B"). Prior to the drafting of the 
written agreement, Russell Scott assisted Mr. Freebairn in 
installing the water line by loaning him money to purchase 
material and by performing some of the labor. The water line 
was installed on the property which became subject to the 
agreement with her brother, but moved water to the Wilstead 
property. (Tr. 376-377, 27-28). 
11. The trust agreement between Miss Freebairn and 
her brother and sister-in-law was drafted by Herbert Halladay, 
an in-house attorney with Security Title Company, on the basis 
of information given to him by Samuel Freebairn in May, 1968. 
Among his notes from that meeting placed in his file is the 
statement: "Russell Scott financed water lines and Sam 
promised to pay him back." (Tr. 378). The written agreement 
itself, in the initial provision which recites the 
consideration given by the party, states: 
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AND WHEREAS approximately one year ago 
First Beneficiary (Miss Freebairn) verbally 
agreed to sell and Second Beneficiary 
(Mr. Freebairn, her brother) verbally agreed 
to purchase said premises and Second 
Beneficiary has heretofore caused said 
property to be platted and engineered and 
has installed some water lines which have 
materially assisted First Beneficiary by 
enabling First Beneficiary to ful-fill her 
commitments to provide water to Robert 
Wilstead and Clifford Green to whom she has 
heretofore sold a piece of adjoining 
property, 
The agreement also provides that: 
Second Beneficiary shall and hereby agrees 
to pay all costs and expenses of said 
subdividing including, but not limited to, 
surveying, platting, engineering, 
installation of water and sewer lines, 
culverting, grading and surfacing of streets 
and such other off-site improvements and 
utilities as may be required, the intent 
being that First Beneficiary shall be under 
no obligation or expense in connection 
therewith. Second Beneficiary further 
agrees to indemnify and save First 
Beneficiary harmless from any and all loss, 
cost or expense which First Beneficiary may 
suffer or sustain in connection with said 
subdividing and improvements including those 
heretofore installed and constructed. First 
Beneficiary is aware of the fact that Second 
Beneficiary has borrowed approximately 
$15,000.00 from Russell Scott to finance the 
construction of said off-site improvements 
heretofore installed and Second Beneficiary 
hereby agrees to pay the same. 
(Exhibit 32 P, Tr. 213). 
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from Agnes Freebairn her interest in those lots along with the 
assumption of the obligation to repay the balance of the money 
Samuel and Agnes had borrowed to develop the property. The 
agreement provided that in order to secure payment by the 
buyer, Miss Freebairn was to have no mortgage or remaining 
interest in the property. Payments of $275 per month were to 
be made in the following manner: 
All of the rights and benefits to seller 
arising as a part of this agreement are to 
be placed in a protective trust for the 
purpose of safeguarding the assets and 
welfare of the seller to the extent that the 
income she needs for personal welfare cannot 
be preyed upon by others. J. Russell Scott 
is to act personally as trustee for such 
trust and to receive all money and disburse 
it according to the instruction of the trust 
with general outline to be $200 per month to 
seller including taxes and $75.00 to current 
bills. 
(Exhibit 12P, Tr. 748-750). 
16. Mr. Scott testified that the $8,000 credit on the 
purchase price consisted of $6,000 which he charged 
Miss Freebairn for a portion of the water line loan made to 
Samuel Freebairn, and $2,000 in other debts. (Tr. 79). 
17. Prior to signing the agreement, Miss Freebairn 
had no advice from any attorney, or from anyone at Security 
Title. She testified that she was not prepared to discuss her 
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property and would sign the agreement only with the 
understanding that a lawyer would look at it later. She 
testified that she did not understand how the purchase price 
was calculated, and thought she should be paid more for her 
property. (Tr. 238-246). 
18* Miss Freebairn testified that she left 
Mr. Burton's office without a copy of the agreement and later 
went to Mr. Duncan, whom she regarded as "Russell's lawyer" who 
told her she had already exchanged her property for an 
unsecured note. (Tr. 246). 
19. Miss Freebairn testified that she had hoped that 
Stuart Udall would keep her from having to go through with the 
deal since he had enough money to fly planes over her house 
every hour, but that she was unable to reach him. She said she 
was sick about it. (Tr. 247-248). 
20, On February 27, 1971, J. Russell Scott executed 
under oath a Petition for Appointment of Guardian which is 
attached hereto as Appendix "E." La Mar Duncan appeared on the 
petition as attorney for the petitioner, Mr. Scott. The 
petition alleges, inter alia, that Mary Jean Freebairn is 
incompetent and 
is now living alone and is incapable, 
without the assistance of some other person, 
to properly manage and care for her 
property, and by reason thereof, would be 
-16-
likely to be deceived or imposed upon by 
artful or designing persons . . . that it is 
necessary that some fit and proper person be 
appointed the guardian of said incompetent, 
to care and properly manage the properties 
and estate of said incompetent. 
See, Appendix D. The petition identified as her assets the sum 
of $100.00/ her residence/ and real property described as "raw 
undeveloped ground suitable for subdividing into home 
sites . . . of the approximate value of $57/000.00 with an 
annual rental value of approximately $600.00". No mention is 
made of the existence of a sales contract between Mr. Scott the 
petitioner/ and Miss Freebairn/ the alleged incompetent. 
Mr. Scott read the petition before signing it. Mr. Scott took 
no action to determine the value of the land which is described 
in the petition other than to assign it the value of his 
purchase contract. (Tr. 100-101). Mr. Scott admitted that 
there was no change in Miss Freebairn's mental competency 
between January 13 and the earnest money agreement was signed 
and February 21, the date he made these allegations. (Tr. 117). 
21. On March 1/ 1971# a closing was scheduled and 
held. However/ no deed was given by Miss Freebairn to the 
Scott Corporation because it was recognized that the property 
was subject to a trust agreement with Security Title Company 
which needed to be terminated. (Tr. 109). On that day 
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Miss Freebairn telephoned Herb Halladay, the Security Title 
Company attorney, who made the following notes about their 
conversation: 
Duncan wants Mary Jean F. to establish a 
guardian for her. Alleges William Smart at 
Deseret News is guilty of a conspiracy ag. 
her. Russell Scott now tired of helping her 
and only has done so in the past because he 
wants her land. They offered her $500.00 
per month income. She said $250.00 for her 
and $250.00 for her nieces and nephews 
college educ. Cut value of contract about 
$20/000—forcing her to pay for water pipe. 
William Smart involved in her life—very 
complicated—the xeroxing she has done would 
reveal the whole story. Sending people to 
her house at all hours to entrap her. She 
complained to Bruce McConkie and visit 
stopped. 
(Exhibit 41P, Tr. 398-391) (Appendix E). 
22. On March 2, 1971 Scott's petition for appointment 
as Miss Freebairn1s guardian was filed with the Third District 
Court. The petition was granted by order of the Third District 
Court on March 22, 1971. (Tr. Ill) 
23. On March 23, 1971, Miss Freebairn herself 
executed a deed conveying the property which had been subject 
to the earnest money agreement to the Scott Investment 
Corporation. On the following day, March 24, 1971, J. Russell 
Scott signed a deed on behalf of the Scott Investment 
Corporation conveying the deed from the corporation to himself 
personally. (Tr. 113, Tr. 118). 
-18-
24. In January, 1972, Miss Freebairn's property was 
sold by Mr. Scott as part of a four-way exchange which had been 
negotiated at least a month beforehand. Mr. Jerry Young was 
the purchaser of Miss Freebairn's property and paid $6,000 an 
acre for it, more than twice the amount which Mr. Scott paid 
Miss Freebairn for the property less than a year before. (Tr. 
123-128). 
25. As a result of the four-way trade, Mr. Scott 
received title to real property located under an office 
building which he had purchased previously. He had previously 
held a long-term lease of the same ground. In addition to the 
property he acquired from Miss Freebairn the year before, 
Mr. Scott traded five acres of land which he had obtained from 
Miss Freebairn as a part of the loan transactions in 1964. In 
November, 1974, Mr. Scott sold both the office building and the 
land under it in one package. The building and ground sold 
together for $777,909.68. According to his own records and his 
accounting to the Internal Revenue Service, 27% of the combined 
sales price represented the purchase price of the ground, or 
$208,955.00. (Tr. 128-136). Mr. Scott paid Miss Freebairn 
$89,564.57 in monthly payments of $250.00, the last payment of 
which was made in 1981, for her property, which included the 
credits for sums he claimed had been owing to her previously. 
According to Mr. Scott's records, he miscalculated the interest 
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owing and overpaid Miss Freebairn by $7,967.63. In addition, 
during the period of his guardianship, Mr. Scott made various 
payments to Miss Freebairn which he identified as loans or 
gifts. (Tr. 781-784). 
26. On November 16, 1982 Mr. Scott signed a Verified 
Answer to a complaint in a collection action against 
Miss Freebairn filed in the Third District Court. (Ex. 30P, 
Tr. 186-187). In it he swore that he had read the document and 
that its contents were true. He stated in paragraph 3, as 
follows: 
Further answering and by way of affirmative 
answer, heretofore, on the 22nd day of 
March, 1971, the above-entitled court in 
probate number 57693, adjudicated the 
defendant an incompetent, because of certain 
mental disorders; that defendant is 
therefore unable to enter into any contract 
whatsoever. Any attempts on the part of the 
plaintiff are null and void. 
(Tr. 188) (emphasis added). A copy of Mr. Scott's Verified 
Answer is attached hereto as Appendix MFM. 
27. When this action was filed against Mr. Scott and 
Mr. Burton in May, 1983, Mr. La Mar Duncan appeared and filed 
an answer on their behalf, again representing Mr. Scott in a 
position adverse to that of Miss Freebairn. (See Case File, 
Document No. 0024, attached hereto as Appendix MG".) 
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28. Plaintiffs' expert real estate appraiser 
testified that the real property which Mr. Scott obtained from 
Miss Freebairn had a market value of $5,000.00 per acre at the 
time of the transaction in January, 1971. He relied upon the 
"comparable sales" or "market data" approach. (Tr. 445). 
29. Relying upon the same approach (and excluding the 
trust agreement between Miss Freebairn and her brother) 
defendants' expert witness testified that the same real estate 
was valued at $3,100.00 per acre at the time of the 
transaction. Using other methods which plaintiff contends were 
objectionable, defendants' expert claimed a sales price of 
$2,600.00 was consistent with the property's value. (Tr. 
597-600). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SALE OF MISS FREEBAIRN'S PROPERTY TO 
MR. SCOTT IS INVALID, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. A GUARDIAN IS NOT PERMITTED TO 
PURCHASE HIS WARD'S PROPERTY. 
It is generally held that 
where a guardian purchases the property of 
his ward, directly or indirectly, the ward 
may have the sale set aside without a 
showing of actual fraud or injury, . . • 
[and that] any investigation into the 
fairness or unfairness of the 
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transaction . . .or good faith of the 
guardian in consummating the sale is 
immaterial. 
39. C.J.S. "Guardian & Ward", § 99 (1976); see also In Re 
Estate of Howard's, 133 Cal. App. 2d 535, 284 P.2d 966 (Cal. 
App. 1955); In the Matter of Guardianship of Eisenberg, 42 
Wash. App. 761, 719 P.2d 187 (Wash. App. 1986). 
This rule is a variant of the general rule of trusts 
that 
a trustee with power to sell trust property 
is under a duty not to sell to himself 
either by private sale or at auction whether 
or not the trustee makes a profit 
thereby . . . [and that] it is immaterial 
that the trustee acts in good 
faith . . . and that he pays a fair 
consideration. 
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 170 (1957). 
This is the law of Utah as well, as articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301, 431 
P.2d 133. (1967): 
One who is a trustee cannot purchase or deal 
with the subject of the trust nor place 
himself in an attitude antagonistic to the 
trust . . . This rule is unyielding and a 
trustee may not, under any circumstances, be 
allowed to have any dealings in the trust 
property with himself or acquire any 
interest therein. 
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Id., 431 P.2d at 137-138. 
Although an earnest money agreement was signed a few 
weeks before Mr. Scott executed the petition to establish his 
guardianship, the order of guardianship was effective the day 
before Mrs. Freebairn executed a deed to Mr. Scott for the 
property. The purchase price was not paid in one sum but in 
monthly installments which continued for over ten years. 
Because the transaction in the present case involves such a 
conveyance by a ward to a guardian, the transaction as between 
Mr. Scott and Miss Freebairn is void. 
B. THE DEED FROM MISS FREEBAIRN TO 
MR. SCOTT IS VOID FOR LACK OF 
JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION. 
Even if a conveyance by a ward to a guardian were not 
absolutely prohibited, no deed by the ward to the guardian, or 
subsequent deed by the guardian to a third party, can be valid 
in the absence of court approval. 
Pertinent provisions of Utah's former Probate Code, in 
effect at the time of the disputed transaction, have been set 
forth previously. In summary, former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-13-32, which described the duties of a guardian, states 
that a guardian must not M . . .make any sale of such property 
[i.e., property of the ward] without the order of the court." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-32 (repealed and replaced 1975). 
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Sections 75-13-33, and 75-13-41 reiterated the power of a 
guardian to sell a ward's property only with prior court 
approval or upon "confirmation" of the sale, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-13-33, 75-13-41 (repealed and replaced 1975). 
Section 75-13-41 incorporated by reference to the provisions of 
the Probate Code relating to decedents* estate for a definition 
of approval by confirmation. Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-41 
(repealed and replaced 1975). 
The confirmation provisions required that a verified 
petition be filed by an executor stating the reasons why a sale 
was in the interest of the estate, and, if the sale were by 
private rather than public auction, proof that the property had 
been appraised within a year and that the purchase price was at 
least 90% of its appraised value, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-10-12, 
75-10-16 (repealed and replaced 1975). If the court found that 
the sale was not in the interest of the estate, it could vacate 
the sale and order acceptance of a different offer. Utah Code 
Ann, § 75-10-15 (repealed and replaced 1975). Most 
importantly, it is clear that title to real property did not 
pass unless the required return was made to the court and 
unless an order of confirmation was issued: 
§ 75-10-3. Sales - Report and 
Confirmation. The executor or administrator 
may sell any property of the estate without 
order of the court, at either public or 
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private sale and without notice as he may 
determine, but must make return of such 
sales in all cases; and if directions are 
given in the will as to the mode of selling, 
or the particular property to be sold, such 
direction must be observed. In any case, no 
title passes unless the sale is confirmed bv 
the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-10-3 (repealed and replaced 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
The Utah Supreme Court held under the old code that, 
except as provided by statute, M . . .the general guardian is 
not authorized to sell the property of the ward or to make a 
contract concerning the sale of the same." In Re Hansen's 
Guardianship, 67 Utah 256, 247 P. 481 at 484 (1926). As the 
Supreme Court of Kansas noted about a statute similar to ours 
in In Re Younkin's Estate, 158 Kan. 431, 147 P.2d 726 (1944): 
. . . the guardian of the estate may sell 
any real estate of an incompetent whenever 
it shall be determined by the court that 
such sale is for the best interests of the 
ward and his estate. It is therefore clear 
a guardian's sale always remains subject to 
the consent and approval of the probate 
court. In the final analysis the sale is 
therefore passed upon and in reality is a 
sale by the court, the deed being executed 
by the guardian of the ward, his legally 
appointed representative. 
Id., 147 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added). 
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When Mr, Scott petitioned for a declaration that 
Miss Freebairn was incompetent and sought appointment as her 
guardian, he did not disclose the existence of an agreement 
between himself and Miss Freebairn concerning sale of the 
property. Furthermore, he did not seek court approval for the 
sale prior to Miss Freebairn1s execution of the deed. In the 
entire twelve and a half years of his guardianship of 
Miss Freebairn, during ten of which he was doling out monthly 
payments pursuant to their contract, he never sought court 
approval of the transaction and never obtained an order of 
confirmation. 
The sale from Miss Freebairn to Mr. Scott was not 
authorized or confirmed by the court and, therefore, was never 
valid. 
C. MISS FREEBAIRN LACKED LEGAL 
CAPACITY TO CONVEY TITLE TO ANYONE 
AFTER A GUARDIAN WAS APPOINTED. 
In most jurisdictions, a person who has been found 
mentally incompetent and who has had a guardian appointed, is 
rendered legally incapable of executing a valid conveyance of 
his property, and deeds given by him are thus void. See, 
Gibson v. Westobv, 115 Cal. App. 2d 273, 251 P.2d 1003 (Cal. 
App. 1953); see also. Citizens State Bank and Trust Co. of 
Hiawatha v. Nolte, 226 Kan, 443, 601 P.2d 1110 (1979); Horton 
v. Lothschultz, 43 Wash, 2d 132, 260 P.2d 777 (1953). Other 
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jurisdictions regard such deeds as merely voidable and protect 
good faith purchasers who were ignorant of the guardianship. 
Under either rule, the deed from Miss Freebairn to Mr. Scott, 
executed the day after the order of guardianship was signed, is 
invalid. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
the question of whether there are any circumstances under which 
a deed given by a person adjudged incompetent can be valid or 
whether such a deed is void or merely voidable. The question 
as it relates to the contractual capacity of an incompetent was 
considered in the case of a person who had been declared 
incompetent under a federal Veterans' Guardianship Act. The 
Utah Supreme Court noted in Home Town Finance Corporation v. 
Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72 (1962), that the requirements 
for appointment of a guardian under the federal act were more 
lenient than those of our own statute and noted that Utah 
statutes "probably required an adjudication that an adult 
person is incompetent to manage his business affairs." id. 368 
P.2d at 75. That case concerned the enforceability of an 
agreement by the ward to pledge his car as security for a 
loan. The guardian, a bank, had only been given control of the 
ward's bank account. It was conceded by the lender that he 
could not reach sums actually placed in trust with the 
guardian. However, the court held that under the federal act, 
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appointment of a guardian created a rebuttable presumption of 
incapacity to contract, and that upon proof that the ward was 
actually competent at the time he pledged his car, the 
agreement could be enforced, id. 368 P.2d at 76. 
The contractual capacity question was also considered 
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applying Utah law 
in Brisacher v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 277 F.2d 519 (10th 
Cir. 1960). Because the trial court found that the ward had 
ratified his contract after his capacity had been judicially 
restored, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question of 
whether in the absence of subsequent ratification the contract 
would have been enforceable. While recognizing that capacity 
to contract and competency under the Utah Probate Code may have 
involved different standards, the court observed that 
It is of course fundamental that a ward is 
not free to deal with his property when 
under the shelter of a valid and existing 
guardianship. Such indeed is the very 
purpose of the guardianship and were the 
rule otherwise the guardian could neither 
execute his trust nor could third persons 
rely upon the authority of the guardian. 
The rule appears conclusive where the rights 
of those who deal with the guardian are 
concerned and where conflict exists between 
guardian and ward. 
Id. 277 F.2d at 521. 
-28-
In the Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1983), an incompetent person, after appointment of a 
guardian, executed a deed from herself, to herself and her 
guardian as joint tenants. The invalidity of the deed was so 
clear that the parties stipulated that it was null and void, 
and the Supreme court affirmed this consent decree on that 
subject. Id., 671 P.2d at 169. 
Where the deeds of an incompetent are regarded as 
void, they are like forged deeds which pass no title even to 
bona fide purchasers for value. See e.g., Gibson v. Westoby 
(cited supra); Olson v. United States, 437 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert, den'd 404 U.S. 939, 30 L.Ed.2d 253 (1971). Even 
if such a deed is voidable as to bona fide purchasers, it is 
absolutely void when given in favor of the very person who 
petitioned for establishment of the guardianship. 
POINT II 
MISS FREEBAIRN LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY 
TO CONTRACT AND CONVEY HER PROPERTY 
The trial court found that Miss Freebairn possessed 
the capacity to contract at the time of the disputed 
transaction. This finding is clearly erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
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As noted, the plaintiff appellant contends that a 
judicial finding of incompetency should render contracts and 
deeds given by the incompetent invalid as a matter of law. At 
the very least/ however, it is clear that the finding of 
incompetency raises a presumption of lack of contractual 
capacity which must be overcome by the party who seeks to 
enforce the contract or deed. See Home Town Finance 
Corporations v. Frank, cited supra. In this case, Mr. Scott 
admitted that there was no change in Miss Freebairn's capacity 
between January 13, the date she signed the earnest money 
agreement, and February 27/ the date he signed the petition 
alleging she was incompetent. And, as noted, the finding of 
incompetency had already been made by the time she signed a 
deed. It was therefore Mr. Scott's burden in the trial court 
to overcome the presumption that Miss Freebairn lacked the 
capacity to sell him her property. 
The legal test of capacity to contract or to make a 
deed are essentially the same. The Utah Supreme Court stated 
in Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945) that, 
In ordinary contracts the test is, Were the 
mental facilities so deficient or impaired 
that there was not sufficient power to 
comprehend the subject of the contract, its 
nature and its probable consequences, and to 
act with discretion in relation thereto, or 
with relation to the ordinary affairs of 
life? 
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159 P.2d at 146 (emphasis added). 
This court held in the recent case of Anderson v, 
Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988) that, 
The test whether a grantor has sufficient 
mental capacity to make a deed is whether 
the mental faculties were so deficient or 
impaired that there was not sufficient power 
to comprehend the subject of the deed, its 
nature and its probable consequences and to 
act with discretion in relation thereto. 
Id., 756 P.2d at 100 (emphasis added). 
This definition of capacity is essentially the same as 
that given in Section 15 of the Restatement (2d) of the Law of 
Contracts: 
§ 15 Mental Illness or Defect 
(1) A person incurs only voidable 
contractual duties by entering into a 
transaction if by reason of mental illness 
or defect: 
(a) he is unable to understand in a 
reasonable manner the nature and 
consequences of the transaction, or 
(b) he is unable to act in a 
reasonable manner in relation to the 
transaction, and the other party has reason 
to know of his condition. 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 15 (1979). 
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When a question as to the competency of a contracting 
party has been raised, a two part inquiry must be made. The 
first concerns the ability of the party to "understand in a 
reasonable manner" the terms of the contract and the 
consequences of entering into it. The second inquiry concerns 
the ability of the party to act reasonably in relation to the 
contract. 
As the commentators to the Restatement of Contracts 
have noted, 
Even though understanding is complete, he 
may lack the ability to control his acts in 
the way that the normal individual can and 
does control them , . . 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 15, Comment 6 (1979). In 
other words, a person may be the victim of a mental disease or 
defect which does not impair his cognitive ability to 
understand the meaning of an agreement he signs, but which 
impairs his ability to make a rational decision about whether 
to sign it at all. 
There was no dispute in the trial court that 
Miss Freebairn suffered from a significant mental illness at 
the time of the disputed transaction. This was apparent from 
her correspondence, from the observations of others, and from 
her own testimony at trial. 
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Plaintiff and defendant each called expert witnesses 
to give testimony about Miss Freebairn's capacity to enter into 
the agreement to sell her property. Dr. Steven Golding, a 
forensic psychologist and professor of psychology at the 
University of Utah, testified on behalf of the plaintiff. He 
concluded that Miss Freebairn suffered from a pervasive disease 
he described as paranoid schizophrenia. (Tr. 290-295). 
Dr. Golding explained his view of the effect of this 
disease on Miss Freebairn's ability to act rationally in 
relation to this transaction, as follows: 
Q So, what is your opinion about how the 
mental disorder she suffered from affected 
her ability to rationally understand the 
contract and to act with discretion in 
relation to the decision? 
A The easiest way to explain that is to 
elaborate upon these motions [sic] of panic 
and compulsion, and it's present in her — 
it's present in her letters and it is 
present in her deposition. 
As Miss Freebairn told me, there are 
times in her life when she feels relatively 
less persuaded and hounded by this 
conspiracy and times when she feels 
relatively more hounded under the direct 
threat of what might happen, for whatever 
reason. And I suppose it would be a 
combination of her real-life circumstances, 
that is her financial fragility and her 
delusional system that she was in, and 
around the time beginning in around 1970, 
actually from the letters, becoming more 
increasingly panicked about two issues. One 
is that they were really out to get her this 
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time, and they, meaning this "fabulized: 
delusional group of people, and two that her 
protector, Stewart Udall, wasn't coming 
through. That's the only way I can describe 
it, namely that she felt like she had very 
few people she could rely upon. The major 
person she hoped, as she says in her 
deposition, none of them would have happened 
if Stewart Udall would have come forth, come 
forth and stopped hiding for whatever reason 
he was hiding from her, probably didn't want 
to be bothered. If he would only come forth 
and help she would not be in such a 
desperate situation. 
And I think it is from a psychological 
point of view just absolutely clear — and 
she herself uses the word 'compel.' She was 
compelled by an internal but rational — 
[sic] that is to say delusional — belief 
that she must do something to render herself 
more viable. She expressed fear that at the 
time the surveillance and counter 
surveillance — I know it's an elaborate, 
obviously crazy system, but that Stewart 
Udall's willingness to covertly provide this 
cover surveillance and protection which was 
in some sense staving off the surveillance 
and harassment by their conspiracy, that she 
was basically convinced that he was — since 
he would not come forth as she unceasingly 
would ask him to and hoping that he would 
and so forth, that she had little choice but 
to sell off what she did not want to sell 
off. And I don't think she did it with the 
kind — obviously, in my opinion at least, 
did it with the kind of consideration or 
discretion or care or whatever that under 
other circumstances she perhaps might be 
capable of doing. I mean it was in a panic, 
and the panic was caused by the delusional 
system and by her mental disorder, and I 
think that is abundantly clear from the 
psychological perspective. 
*** 
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Q Do you think she was able to understand 
in a rational way the consequences of what 
she was doing when she signed that agreement? 
A I think she factually understood that 
she was selling this property, but if we now 
have to clarify what we mean by "rational," 
and perhaps that's the crunch issue here, 
what constitutes a rational or reasonable as 
opposed to factual kind of understanding, I 
think it is clear from a psychological 
perspective that she did not anticipate the 
requirements of that kind of transaction in 
the sense that while someone can certainly 
do something stupid, and I guess the law 
permits them to be stupid or even irrational 
or impulsive, I don't think she had a lot of 
choice in that matter. 
. . . so, my professional opinion is that 
she did not have the rational anticipation 
of the nature of the transaction, although 
she certainly understood that she was 
selling land. I don't know if I can go much 
further. 
Q Aside from understanding that she was 
selling land, do you have an opinion about 
whether she was able to make a rational 
choice about whether it was in her interest 
to sell her land or not in the way that 
someone without this disorder would have 
been able to make a rational choice about 
whether or not to sell their land? 
A I have already used the words in some 
sense confusion and fear and panic, and to 
draw out the implications of that, I don't 
think that an individual, in my clinical 
experience, an individual who is in a very 
real sense in the throes of an assault on 
their existence is very capable of making 
many choices at all except to defend 
themselves in the only way that they know 
how. 
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When a different kind of paranoid 
schizophrenic individual does some kind of 
thinking out in public and/or assaults a 
public person, they're not going to do it in 
some sense out of choice; they're doing it 
because these people are flying the 
helicopters that are getting ready to bomb 
their house, to use an analogy. So, the 
meaning of the word "rational" implies that 
there is a freedom of choice that one is not 
under the influence of that kind of internal 
or external coercion, and that in this case 
the coercion, if there is coercion, is 
primarily internal and delusional. So, in 
my opinion it was not a rational choice. In 
particular the nature of her letters and the 
nature of her description of her mental 
state at the time leads me to conclude that 
her preference, her druthers obviously would 
have been never to sell that land unless it 
was absolutely necessary and as a way of 
holding onto her heritage and so forth and 
perhaps being able to turn it over to some 
of her relatives when she died. 
Clearly that was a knowledge — that's 
unrealistic, given her financial 
circumstances, but at that particular moment 
in time I think that the only option or 
choice that she saw as available — and I 
don't know because I have no records made 
available to me, nor I haven't been at the 
trial — I don't know what the evidence has 
been, what conversations took place at that 
moment in time in terms of individuals 
whomever they might be suggesting to her 
ways out of her current financial 
predicament, but she wasn't looking out at 
the world and surveying it with anything 
that I would call a free-and-rational 
intellect. 
Q And that would include this contract? 
A Yes. 
-36-
(Tr. 304-310). 
In sum, while Dr. Golding concluded that while 
Miss Freebairn may have possessed the mental capacity to have a 
factual understanding of the transaction, she lacked the 
capacity to make a rational decision about whether or not to 
enter into the transaction at all. 
The defendant called as a witness Dr. John Malouf, a 
psychologist who had previously testified about 
Miss Freebairn's competency in 1983 when the court concluded 
that she remained in need of a guardian. Prior to taking the 
witness stand, he had not considered evidence of her capacity 
to contract in 1971, though he did cursorily review some of the 
contemporaneous correspondence during a recess. (Tr. 493). 
In any event, on the critical issue, Dr. Malouf's 
testimony did not differ dramatically from Dr. Golding's. 
Dr. Malouf agreed that Miss Freebairn suffered from a "very 
elaborate delusional process" which he characterized as a 
"paranoid delusion disorder" rather than paranoid 
schizophrenia (Tr. 497). He admitted that a person who 
suffered from this condition, even though she was intelligent, 
might, while under the influence of the delusional system, be 
unable to make a rational judgment about a particular 
transaction: 
-37-
Q Wouldn't you also agree with me, 
doctor, that in the case of someone who had 
either of those two disorders, and let's 
assume that we're talking about a person who 
has the delusional disorder and not 
schizophrenia, isn't it true that a person 
who suffers from the delusional disorder who 
may be a very intelligent person may yet, 
under certain circumstances, when influenced 
by the delusion be unable to make a rational 
judgment about a particular transaction? 
A Yeah, that's possible. 
Q So, such a person in a business 
transaction, let's say, hypothetically might 
be able to read and understand the contents 
of a document, but for whatever reason that 
person, under the effects of the delusional 
system, at the point that person's ability 
to rationally decide what to do in the 
business transaction could be impaired? 
A Yes. 
Q And a rational judgment could be 
totally absent depending on how that 
delusional system affected that particular 
circumstance; isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
(Tr. 514-515), 
However, his fundamental opinion about 
Miss Freebairn's contractual capacity did not reach the 
critical question of her ability to make a rational decision 
about the transaction in question: 
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Q [Mr. Jordan:] Thank you. Now, I will 
put to you a question that I asked before 
that I think we have now laid the foundation 
for. 
Based upon your review of the materials 
that Exhibit 11 and all the other testing 
and interviewing that you did of 
Miss Freebairn, all the information that you 
have been able to gather about her and your 
diagnosis, what is your professional opinion 
as to her ability in the 1970, 1971 time 
period to transact business intelligently? 
A Intelligently — Now, again, to speak 
of — 
Q Transaction, business. Let me just — 
A I think she would have knowledge. She 
would have had adequate knowledge to know if 
she was selling something, what she was 
selling, what she was receiving for it, 
those sorts of specifics. 
[Mr. Jordan:] All right. That's all I 
have. 
(Tr. 497). 
The defendant, who had the burden of proving 
Miss Freebairn*s capacity to contract, never rebutted 
Dr. Golding's testimony that Miss Freebairn was unable to act 
with discretion in relation to the transaction in question. 
Even though the defendant did offer the testimony of 
defendant Le R Burton that at the time of the execution of the 
agreement Miss Freebairn seemed to understand the transaction, 
Mr. Burton was the secretary of the corporation which was 
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buying the property, the drafter of the agreement, and the 
broker who earned a commission by selling the property. 
Mrs. Agnes Freebairn testified that she was also present and 
observed that Miss Freebairn completely understood the 
transaction. However, at her deposition taken just two months 
before her trial testimony, Agnes Freebairn had no recollection 
of being present at the signing of the document at all. (Tr. 
544-546). Furthermore, Agnes Freebairn benefitted tremendously 
from the transaction by being relieved of both the burden of 
developing property she was incapable of developing, and the 
obligation of paying off a development loan for which her own 
home served as collateral. (Tr. 529, 541-542). 
If the testimony of the expert witnesses did not fully 
resolve the question of Miss Freebairn*s mental capacity, the 
notes of the conversations between Herbert Halladay, the 
Security Title attorney, and Miss Freebairn on March 1, 1971 
do. She telephoned him on the day the closing of the sale was 
scheduled. The earnest money agreement had been signed six 
weeks beforehand. Mr. Scott had already executed the petition 
for guardianship, but did not present it to the court for 
filing until the day after the closing. Mr. Halladay*s notes, 
made at the time of their conversation, state, as follows: 
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Duncan wants Mary Jean F. to establish a 
guardian for her. Alleges William Smart at 
Deseret News is guilty of a conspiracy ag. 
her. Russell Scott now tired of helping her 
and only has done so in the past because he 
wants her land. They offered her $500.00 
per month income. She said $250.00 for her 
and $250.00 for her nieces and nephews 
college educ. cut value of contract about 
$20,000—forcing her to pay for water pipe. 
William Smart involved in her life—very 
complicated—the xeroxing she has done would 
reveal the whole story. Sending people to 
her house at all hours to entrap her. She 
complained to Bruce McConkie and visits 
stopped. 
(Exhibit 41P, Tr. 398-391) (See Appendix "E"). 
This memorandum of the phone conversation between 
Mr. Halladay and Miss Freebairn is the best contemporary 
evidence of Miss Freebairn1s mental state, and it comes from an 
impartial witness. It establishes several critical points: 
First, Miss Freebairn, as of March 1, did not appear 
to believe that she had already entered into a binding 
contract; she describes the transaction as though it were still 
being negotiated. Second, she did not have an accurate factual 
understanding of the agreement; she refers to monthly payments 
of $500.00 with $250.00 to be used for her nieces* and nephews' 
education. The earnest money agreement provides for payments 
of $275.00 a month for her benefit and includes no reference to 
payments to her nieces and nephews. Third, she expresses her 
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sense of being compelled to accept terms proposed by others, 
i.e, "forcing her to pay for waterpipe." Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, she intertwines her description of the 
pending transaction with references to the conspiracy against 
her, "William Smart involved in her life . . . sending people 
at all hours to her home to entrap her . . ." These references 
substantiate Dr. Golding's testimony that the delusional system 
deprived her of an ability to make a voluntary and rational 
decision about the sale of her property. 
As if this were not enough, Mr. Scott has already 
admitted in a verified pleading that Miss Freebairn lacked the 
capacity to enter into an enforceable contract (Tr. 188). It 
is well-established that a party may not seek relief by 
alleging certain facts to be true, and then take a different 
position about the same facts in a subsequent proceeding. See, 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 at 495-496 (Utah 1980), 
Mr. Scott stated under oath that on account of the mental 
disorders which led to the guardianship, Miss Freebairn was 
incapable of entering into a contract and that any attempt to 
do so was null and void. He should be estopped from taking a 
contrary position in the case at bar. 
The evidence that Miss Freebairn lacked the mental 
capacity to contract or convey her property is overwhelming. 
The finding of the Third District Court in 1971 that she was 
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incompetent raised a presumption that she lacked contractual 
capacity which was not overcome. The trial court's finding to 
the contrary is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE SALE OF MISS FREEBAIRN'S PROPERTY 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT UNFAIRLY 
BENEFITTED THE DOMINANT PARTY TO A 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
An agreement to convey real property made by a party 
with mental capacity to contract is still voidable if it was 
entered into between parties to a confidential relationship and 
unfairly benefitted the party in the superior position. 
Furthermore, once it has been established that a confidential 
relationship exists, the transaction is presumed to be unfair. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bradbury v. 
Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965): 
If a confidential relationship is shown to 
exist, and a gift or conveyance is made to a 
party in a superior position, a presumption 
arises that the transaction was unfair; this 
presumption has the force of evidence and 
will itself support a finding if not 
overcome by countervailing evidence. The 
burden is upon the superior party to 
convince the court by a preponderance (not 
clear and convincing) of the evidence that 
the transaction was fair. 
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Id. 401 P.2d at 713. See also Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 
(Utah 1984); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 
(1959). 
It has been noted that there are some relationships 
which the law presumes to be confidential, such as, 
parent-child, attorney-client and trustee-cestui. Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.d 298 at 302 (Utah 1978). Otherwise, the 
question is one of fact: 
The doctrine of confidential relationship 
rests upon the principle of inequality 
between the parties, and implies a position 
of superiority occupied by one of the 
parties over the other. Mere confidence in 
one person to another is not sufficient 
enough to constitute such a relationship.. 
The confidence must be reposed by one under 
such circumstances as to create a 
corresponding duty, either legal or moral, 
upon the part of the other to observe the 
confidence and it must result in a situation 
where as a matter of fact there is superior 
influence on one side and dependence on the 
other. 
Bradbury 401 P.2d at 713. In Blodgett v. Martsch, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that 
If the circumstances are such that the 
defendant could exercise extraordinary 
influence over the plaintiff and the 
defendant was or should have been aware that 
the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence 
in the defendant and reasonably relied on 
defendant's guidance, then the parties are 
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said to be in 'confidential relationship* 
and the plaintiff's burden is considerably 
diminished. 'A course of dealing between 
persons so situated is watched with extreme 
jealously and solicitude, and if there is 
found the slightest tract of undue influence 
or unfair advantage, redress will be given 
to the injured party." 
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. (Emphasis added). 
The trial court made no specific finding that 
Miss Freebairn and Mr. Scott were parties to a confidential 
relationship, but found that the transaction was "fair and 
without fraud or undue influence." (See, Memorandum Decision 
of Trial Court, attached hereto as Appendix "H".) 
There can actually be no question that the plaintiff 
and defendant were parties to a confidential relationship. The 
earnest money agreement itself refers to their contemplation 
that Mr. Scott would act as "trustee" for Miss Freebairn. 
Shortly beforehand, Miss Freebairn gave Mr. Scott a mortgage to 
her home which he described as being for her own "protection." 
(Tr. 53-54). And, Mr. Scott testified that the reason it was 
not necessary for the land being sold to serve as security for 
his promise to pay for it was that Miss Freebairn "trusted" him 
enough. (Tr. 83). Of course, once the guardianship was 
established, the two were by definition parties to a 
confidential relationship. 
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A presumption arose, therefore, that the transaction 
in question unfairly benefitted Mr. Scott, and it was his 
burden to prove to the contrary. It is plain that he failed to 
carry that burden. 
The unfairness of the transaction is evident in 
several ways. First, there is no justification for a deduction 
from the purchase price of six thousand dollars which the 
agreement states "was previously invested in the subject 
property." Samuel and Agnes Freebairn quite clearly agreed, as 
between themselves and Miss Freebairn, to pay for the water 
line which was installed on the property under development and 
which allowed water to be delivered to the Wilstead property. 
Miss Freebairn*s property was still subject to that trust 
agreement in January 1971. Agnes Freebairn owed that 
obligation, and yet rather than obtain payment from her, 
Mr. Scott charged it as a credit against the purchase price of 
the property. 
Second, Mr, Scott did not establish that the purchase 
price itself was fair. Plaintiff's appraiser testified that 
the property was worth $5,000.00 an acre at the time of the 
sale. Mr. Scott paid approximately $2,600.00 per acre if he is 
permitted the credit for the water line, or less than $2,400.00 
per acre if that credit is not permitted. Using the market 
data approach, (and excluding the 1968 transaction between Miss 
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Freebairn and her brother) Mr. Scott's own appraiser, Mr. Van 
Drimmelen, after indulging in every presumption in his favor, 
testified that the market value of the property was $3,100.00 
per acre. (Tr. 597-600). 
Despite this conclusion, the defendant's appraiser 
testified that he thought a purchase price of $2,600.00 per 
acre was "within the range" of the fair market appraisal of the 
property. (Tr. 614). To reach this conclusion, however, he 
relied upon irrelevant and inadmissible factors. First, he 
assumed that the cost of developing the property was the sum 
that Samuel Freebairn borrowed, and projected the price per lot 
which would have to be generated to make a profit on lot 
sales. This testimony was received over plaintiff's 
objections, (Tr. 608-609), and in contravention of the rule 
that where market data is available, evidence of the 
profitability to an individual of a particular use of property 
is inadmissible. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that in the ordinary 
case, proof of "market value" should be used to determine the 
value of property and that only where market data is lacking 
should other methods be employed. Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arthur. 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 at 695 (1960). It has 
also been stated that, "[a]s a rule, evidence of the profits of 
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a business conducted on land is inadmissible as evidence of the 
market value of the land." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 955 
(1988) • 
Not only was the appraisal method improper, but the 
defendant's appraiser was simply asked to assume that Samuel 
Freebairn's loan represented the development cost of the land 
without any evidence that that sum was, in fact, the reasonable 
cost of developing it. (Tr. 609). The trial court did, 
however, indicate that he would not rely heavily on this 
evidence. (Tr. 208). 
Furthermore, the appraiser considered a written 
appraisal done by another appraiser, Mr. Werner Kiepe, of the 
same land in 1968 who indicated in his report that he relied 
upon a "comparable sales" approach but failed to include in his 
report the market data he relied upon. When Mr. Kiepe was 
called to the stand, he had no recollection of what market data 
formed the basis of his opinion, (Tr* 557-559). Plaintiff 
objected to the admissibility of his appraisal since he could 
not be cross examined about its foundation, (Tr. 552-558). 
Eventually the court excluded the written report, but allowed 
the defendant's expert to note Mr. Kiepe's opinion that the 
property had a value of $2500 per acre in 1968, exclusive of 
improvements made by Samuel Freebairn. The fact that neither 
Mr, Kiepe nor defendant's expert could articulate the facts and 
-48-
data which underlay Mr. Kiepe's opinion, made it improper for 
the expert or the court to rely upon that opinion. Utah R. 
Evid. 705. 
Finally, defendant's appraiser lowered his view of the 
fair value of the property when he included in his calculation 
the transaction between Mrs. Freebairn and her brother, a 
transaction which was peculiarly structured, which included 
consideration such as the agreement to pay for the water line 
which was not a part of the stated price per acre, and which 
was not an arm's length transaction. (Tr. 558-559). 
A conclusion that $2,600 was the fair market value of 
the property in 1971 is suspect to begin with in view of the 
fact that Mr. Scott himself paid Miss Freebairn $3,000 an acre 
for adjoining property in 1964. But the most telling evidence 
about the market value of the property is that less than one 
year later, Mr. Jerry Young, a seasoned real estate developer, 
paid $6,000 an acre for the very same land! (Tr. 409). 
Mr. Young said that $6,000 an acre was a fair price for the 
land in January 1972. (Tr. 427), and as a result of their 
four-way trade, Mr. Scott acquired the land under his office 
building, which he resold at a great profit to himself less 
than two years later. (Tr. 128-131). 
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It defies common sense to contend that land which was 
worth $2600 an acre in January, 1971, without any additional 
improvements, was worth $6,000 an acre in January 1972. It is 
true that other developers built sewer lines on adjoining 
property between those dates which improved sewer access to the 
subject property but there was no evidence that this occurrence 
was not reasonably expected in January 1971. 
The transaction was unfair because Mr. Scott paid less 
than the fair market value for the property and because he 
deducted sums from the purchase price which he had no right to 
deduct. The plaintiff lacked the benefit of any independent 
advice about the value of the property or the wisdom of 
entering into the transaction. And, by simply holding the 
property and selling it in combination with a few acres he had 
previously obtained from Mrs. Freebairn, Mr. Scott was able to 
reap an enormous profit. 
Mr. Scott failed to carry his burden of proving that 
he did not unfairly benefit from this transaction. It should 
be set aside for this reason, if not for others previously 
discussed. 
POINT IV 
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST SHOULD BE IMPOSED 
UPON THE PROCEEDS OF MR. SCOTT'S SALE 
OF THE LAND HE TRADED FOR MISS FREEBAIRN1S 
PROPERTY 
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A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which 
arises by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment, when, 
among other situations, a person "unjustly profit[s] through 
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship." Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 
708 at 710 (Utah 1977); see also, Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147 at 150 (Utah 1987); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 
372 at 375 (1953). One such fiduciary relationship is that 
between a guardian and a ward. Utah Code Ann. § 22-1-1 
(1953). In fact, it has been said that "in no relation, except 
perhaps that of parent and child or husband and wife, are the 
elements of confidence on one side and active good faith on the 
other more essential than in the relation of guardian and 
ward." 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 208 (1968). 
A guardian/ward relationship is, by definition, a 
trustee/beneficiary relationship for which trust law, 
specifically provided by the imposition of a constructive trust 
when a trustee wrongfully acquires trust property and exchanges 
it for other property: 
Where the trustee by the wrongful 
disposition of trust property acquires other 
property, the beneficiary is entitled at his 
option either to enforce a constructive 
trust of the property so acquired or to 
enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure 
his claim against the trustee for damages 
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for breach of trust/ as long as the product 
of the trust property is held by the trustee 
and can be traced. 
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 202(1) (1957). Additionally/ 
Comment (a) to this section states. 
Where the trustee by the wrongful 
disposition of trust property acquires other 
property which is or becomes more valuable 
than trust property used in acquiring it/ 
the beneficiary is entitled to reach the 
property so acquired and thus secure the 
profit which arises from the transaction. 
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 202(1)/ Comment a (1957). 
Even in cases not involving trust relationships, Utah 
courts have imposed constructive trusts broadly. 
Constructive trusts include all those 
instances in which a trust is raised by the 
doctrines of equity for the purpose of 
working out justice in the most efficient 
manner, where there is no intention of the 
parties to create such a relation, and in 
most cases contrary to the intention of the 
one holding legal title, and where there is 
no express or implied, written or verbal, 
declaration of the trust. 
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 at 599 (Utah 
1983) (citing, Powery, J., Equity Jurisprudence, § 1044 (1941)) 
(emphasis added). Thus, under Utah law, a constructive trust 
should be imposed liberally, in many situations to ensure 
equity and prevent unjust enrichment. 
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In the event that trust property has been re-conveyed, 
the constructive trust beneficiary should be awarded the 
proceeds of subsequent transfers, which can be accomplished by 
tracing the property through an unlimited number of 
transactions or changes in form if necessary. In Re 
Independent Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985 at 1000 (Bankr. 
D. Utah 1984) (affd in part and rev'd in part and on other 
grounds, In Re Universal Clearing House Co., 62 Bankr. 118 (D. 
Utah 1986); In Re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 Bankr. 843 
(D. Utah 1987)). 
Furthermore, it is well-settled that when the trust 
property, or its subsequent proceeds, appreciate in value, the 
profit should be included as proceeds and awarded to the 
beneficiary. 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts, § 254, (1975). In a 
treatise entitled "Remedies, it is provided that a plaintiff 
may obtain "a considerable profit," and cited an example which 
mirrors the facts of our case: 
. . . if the defendant secured Blackacre by 
fraud at a time when it was worth $10,000, 
and then traded it for Whiteacre which was 
worth $15,000, a constructive trust in the 
plaintiff's favor on Whiteacre would net him 
property worth considerably more than the 
property he lost. 
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Dobbs, Remedies, p. 242 (West Publ. 1973). In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court held in 1844 that "the rule in equity is, 
that all the gain made by the trustee, by a wrongful 
appropriation of the trust fund, shall go to the [trust]." 
Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 333, 61 L.Ed. 622 (1844). 
Whether the transaction in question is set aside as 
being void as a matter of law, or because the grantor lacked 
the requisite mental capacity, or because it resulted from the 
breach of a confidential relationship, the remedy is the same. 
Mr. Scott is deemed to have held Miss Freebairn's property in 
constructive trust for her benefit from March 1971 until 
January 1972. When he traded her land for another parcel in 
January 1972, he is deemed to have obtained that parcel in 
constructive trust for her as well. Additionally, when he sold 
the second parcel in November 1974, he is deemed, by law, to 
have received the proceeds for her benefit. 
Thus the imposition of a constructive trust upon those 
proceeds case is the proper remedy in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The law has long recognized that some people suffer 
from mental diseases which deprive them of the ability to look 
out for themselves in business dealings. Legal guardianship is 
one protection afforded to such a person. A guardian's job is 
to exercise on behalf of the ward, the independent and informed 
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business judgment which the ward is found incapable of 
exercising for himself. It would defeat the very purpose of 
guardianship if the guardian were permitted to take control of 
a ward's property and then exercise his business acumen in 
relation to the property to reap a profit for himself rather 
than for the ward. 
Another protection for the mentally handicapped is the 
rule that the law will not enforce an agreement unless each 
party is able to make a rational decision about whether or not 
to enter into the agreement. Finally, the law protects those 
who, on account of a special relationship, are less likely than 
others to be able to bargain on equal footing and strike a fair 
deal for themselves. Notably, none of these protections is 
contingent upon the intention or motive of the other party. 
Mr. J. Russell Scott has earned a handsome profit for 
himself by acquiring land from Miss Freebairn at a time when 
she suffered from a serious mental disease and when he was 
under a duty to act as her protector. The benefit he obtained 
by holding the property until an opportunity arose for an 
advantageous sale, and doing the same with the parcel he 
exchanged for it, should be returned to Miss Freebairn who was 
forced for years to live on $250.00 a month while he enjoyed 
the profit earned from dealing with her property. 
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APPENDIX A: SELECTED LETTER OF FREEBAIRN 
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March 25, 1970 
Questions to be asked of William Smart, 
Executive Editor of the Deseret Newsi 
! • You are accused of perpetrating and carrying 
out, personally, and with the assistance 
of many of the employees of the Deseret News, 
as we l l as other individuals, a criminal 
conspiracy against Uiss iiary Jean Freobairn. 
Will you comment about th i s please• 
2. You are accused of obtaining Miss Freebaim *s 
nai l fron the Salt Lake Post Office 
(1) for the i l l e g a l purposes of burlesqueing 
i t in cartoons in the Deseret News; 
(2) of copying i t ; (3) of circulating i t 
to unauthorized persona. 
7/ill you answer the following questions 
with respect to t h i s , pleasat 
(A) From whan have you obtained such authority.? 
(B) Why ha/e you copied and circulated 
her mail? 
(C) To whom has i t been circulated? 
(Supply a complete l i s t of individuals 
wno have r<3Cr sc her mail, and render 
an explanation of the intent 
for which i t was given to them, ) 0 0 ^ 0 0 4 2 
You are accused of having installed 
in liiss Freebairn's home electronic devices 
which enable you to audit her conversations, 
as well as to h^ ve installed electronic devices 
on the telephones of members of her family. 
Please explain (1) the authority 
by which you were able to place such equipment 
in her home; (2) who supplied the equipment. 
You are accused of having used the electronic 
device in Uiss Freebairn!s home to put forward 
improper suggestions to her. Will you comment 
about your having tormented her with such equipment 
for five years. 
You are accused of having placed television 
equipment in Miss Freebairn!s home, 
with which you have entertained a group of lemi 
men on closed circuit television. Will you please 
inform the Church as to the authority 
by which this was done and the names of persons 
whose homes are serviced by such television l ines . 
0000013 
You are accused of using the television 
and electronic equipment in Miss Freebairn's 
horns in order to follow her and annoy her, 
and you have used Deseret News employees 
to do this on the following occasions: 
February 25, May 17, May 21st, June 26th, 
July 9th, August 13th, December S, 19^9, 
February 15, and March 17, 1970. 
Please comment. 
You are accused of sending people to Miss Freeoairn's 
home to harrass and annoy her, and this has occurred 
in the past, as well as recently on March 15th, 
and March 22, 1970 
You are accused of having sent men 
to Miss Freeoairn's home for immoral purposes 
on August 30, I969, February 2, 1970, 
and March 25th, 1970, after which occasions 
you have published cartoons which were both offensive 
to and injurious to fehe reputation of Miss Freebairn. 
Miss Freebaim has requested that you 
and everyone involved in the conspiracy against 
her be excommunicated, TO.11 you comment 
about this, please* 
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During the past two years, due to interference from 
the Cannon Committee, I have had to change dressmakers, 
I have had to find a new physician, I have had to locate a nev« bank, 
a new lawyer, a new insurance agent, and a new hair salon* 
DR2SSKAX2R: On July 15, 1966, I had gone to the home of 
lirs. Anne Norby, 1175 South 12th .Vest, and I was wearing a w i te maternity 
top over stretch pants (which i s a comfortable manner of dressing 
that i s more characteristic of my clothing when I am in the 
mountains a t our summer home than in the c i t y , but since I was 
in the company of my tiny nenhew, who was two years old, I 
had decided to wear things he couldn ft ruin when he climbed. The 
maternity blouses are longer and more comnodious than ordinary 
blouses, and I have bought them for that reason). 
Ly being at the dressmakers for a f i t t i n g of some new clothing 
was later burlesqued by the newspapers, who rumored that I was 
pregnant. I t was how I discovered that they were using 
te lev i s ion cameras in their techniques of snooping* 
FhYSTGI/Jh Dr. James Vebster, 508 East South Templo, w o treatod mo 
for pneumonia from January £0, I96S through January 2kth, was 
not unfamiliar with my problem with the Cannon Committee, because 
he had asked roe what might be troubling me, and I had tried to t e l l ham 
of the problem and of some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s I had experienced because 
of constant harassment. I t did not surprise me one day that 
in examining me, he became familiar. But he was one of the few persons 
who has indicated by a glance that our conversation was being l istened t o , 
and I f e l t that he was trying to a s s i s t me through a d i f f i c u l t t r i a l . 
OOOOi;: 1 
BANK: University Branch of Walker Bank supplied members 
of the Cannon Committee with a $1.00 overdraft, which had 
long-since been paid, but which was burlesqued by the Newspaper Agency 
corjnittee a t a time when my legal representative was in Salt Lake 
from Washington and was arguing with them over the condition 
of my finances. I believe Zane Morrison to have been the person 
who supplied them with the overdraft. 
LA'iTYSR: David E. Salisbury, liA East F irs t South, who has 
been a roost loyal l egal adviser, allowed the Cannon Committee to 
place a camera jn his of f ice , during conversations that I was 
having with him that related to D. James Cannon. I t was not 
unt i l later that I discovered that Mr. Salisbury and lir. Cannon 
are business partners in a land development project in 
Snyderville• 
HAIR SAL0K: David Kimball, who owns "David's Salon1' 
a t 31^9 Highland Drive, who is a brother-in-law of 
Herbert Price of the Sal t Lake Tribune, was combing my hair 
one afternoon, when he received a telephone c a l l . 
Without any provocation, he began to say things to the person 
on the telephone that were derogatory and disparaging of me. 
Since his remarks were made in a tone of r id icu le , I disregarded them, 
but I learned through the Tribune and the News that what he did 
was premeditated and was calculated to influence my legal adviser, 
who was l i s ten ing at another place. l£r. Kimball's behavior 
represented an important development to me, because i t indicated 
that he had read l e t t e r s I had written and because he was . 
privileged to observe me by t e l ev i s ion . I have maintained 
that my l e t t e r s were being c ircr la t jd , and that a lewd 
c irc le of persons was being entertained by the camera 
that i s in my home. Except for his cutting my hair once a month, 
David Kirr.ball i s an absolute stranger to me. 
000C125 
On three occasions, persons h.ve come to my hone 
who were carrying hidden microphones for the purpose of interviewing 
me for the Cannon Committee. Their being here was later 
caricatured. 
In January, 1966, Howard 0. Lawrence, a schoolteacher 
who said he represented the U. S. Department of Labor, Office 
of Uanoower, Automation and Training, asked to interview me 
for the purpose of discovering why people weren't accepting 
the retraining programs offered by the government. In doing so , 
he took down s ix pages of very personal information concerning 
my f-'nancial s i tuat ion, a l l of w; ich he delivered to the 
Cannon Committee. 
On June 20, I967, Dorrel L. Decker, ana^ent for the 
Prudential Insurance Company, who sold me my present policy in 
1962, came to my home to co l l ec t a semj-annual oa^ment. 
In doing so , he asked ms what my opinion was of a woran 
who could not give of herself completely to her husband. 
KG pretended to bo hazing such a problem himself, but he 
real ly wanted to sup )ly the Cannon Co-mittee with gris t for their mi l l . 
Saturday, October 7, 19&7* ^TS* K e v a Hyatt Snow, 
a person withtfiom I had worked a t Eitel McCullough Corporation 
(my f i r s t job) came to my home accompanied by another woman 
on the pretext of paying a social v i s i t . Because I h.;d believed that she h»d 
been trying to contact me for this speci f ic purpose prior to this 
date (she contacted me through n&r s i s t e r , who she had never met, 
which gave me a c lue) , I hadn't acknowledged several Christmas 
cards ?n$ r^lephone messjges from her, sent over a three year periM, 
but one day she had the cheek to come uninvited, and 
afterward, she supplied her information to the Co-mittee. 
U . S . D E P A R T M E N T OF LABOR 
^^= OFFICE OF MANPOWER, AUTOMATION AND TRAINING 
WASHINGTON, O.C 20210 
January, 1966 
K. J. Freebarin 
1505 South 5rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
To Whom It May Concern: 
The Department of Labor and the Office of Education are conducting a 
study of Manpower Development and Training Programs. These two Federal 
agencies have contracted with the National Opinion Research Center, 
University of Chicago, for assistance in this effort. An important part 
of this study involves interviewing persons throughout the country who 
have participated in the manpower training program. 
The information gathered on this study will be used to improve the 
training program which is presently in operation, and training programs 
which will be available in years to come. Your opinions and experiences 
are vital to this study and can be of great assistance in the improve-
ment of the program* 
NORC is a non-profit research organization which has conducted surveys 
all over the country for over twenty years. Their work is for research 
purposes only. Of course, all answers and statements given to their 
interviewers are strictly confidential. Names or other identification 
are never used in their reports and will never be given to anyone else 
for Any reason* 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Howard 0. Lawrenea C/UZ^l C # vic^cfa^S 
Pn: W-6815 Director 
OOOOIi 
Police procoduros in Utah roquire that anyone who is guilty 
(or suspected) of criminal conduct be kept under surveillance, 
and when such a person movo3 to another oity, the police 
in his new neighborhood must be informed of the arrival 
of the "criminal." This pertains also to places of employment, 
as well as residences. 
In February of 19&7> * accepted a job 
with Holt, Rinehart and Winston publishers in New York. 
1 was given the task of being the New Products Editor 
for Field and Stream Magazine, and I was assigned to 
the Advertising Department, where I had a private office and 
telephone* The company had not been able to f i l l tnis 
particular position for three months. Consequently, 
there was a backlog of work that kept me busy and to which 
I devoted my lunch hour, as well as an hour each morning, 
which I was able to do by arriving at 6 a.m. instead of 9. 
IVhen the Newspaper Agency Corporation discovered where I was, 
an industrial spy named Miss Sonja Ratasky was placed 
in the organization to sabotage my position, She did this in much 
the samo way that Mr. Kimball tried to ruin my l i fe by saying 
things into the telephone that he had been tutored to say, 
although he was a complete stranger to me. Hiss Ratasky came 
to my private office and deliberately began to argue. I t became 
evident that the things she was s aying were things she had been 
asked to say, and although I had met the requirements of 
the position to the extent that the observation was made by 
my employer that I was "overqualified" for the work, I was.foroed 
to resign because of the unpleasantness that was created. 
Kiss Ratasky was on the staff of the Adv* ** **ng Department 
for less than a month. 
Vfnen the Newspaper Agency Corporation Committee learned 
in November of I967 that I was planning to hire a New York attorney 
to represent me in a court action against them, the members 
used cartoons of a threatening nature to l e t me know that I could expect 
evil consequences for doing so. 
As a resul t , I remained in Southampton, New York 
through December, and I returned to Utah the week of 
January 3rd, I96S. 
In Southampton, I rented a room from Lr. and llrs. Kenry Bis en off 
a t 161 Hampton Road, and they were as hospitable as anyone could 
have been, but i t wasn!t long before they began to treat me 
in a manner that told me that they had been asked to keep 
me under surveillance. 
Anyone reading tms history might wonder whether 
I was not able a t some time to confront my enemies openly. 
("A visible enemy can be subdued, but an invisible foe 
cannot ever be assailed,") 
Fortunately, by a miscalculation, this secret system 
revealed i t se l f in a manner that could lead to i t s dissolution, 
as well as the indictment of i ts leaders* 
00001-3 
\7hen the Committee observed in June of I966, that 1 had 
written a l e t t e r to congratulate Wr. Stewart L. Udall, 
Secretary of the Interior, who gave the Commencement Address 
a t Utah State University, they appointed one of their members 
towr i t e a l e t t e r to Mr, Udall that was derogatory of myself. 
When lir. Udall (who is a member of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and a cousin through 
the Jacob Hamblin family of a cousin of mine through 
the Russell family) treated me without any explanation 
in an official way, rather than to ca l l me "Vary Jean," 
•.s he had done when I ras a student a t Columbia University, 
I knew what had hap->ened. As a result of that intuitive direction, 
1 kept writing to him. I implored him to ass is t me by 
bringing the charges (whatever they might have been) into 
the open. (Onl; someone who has been a prisoner could have 
understood my concern.) Although Mr. Udall never responded 
to another l e t t e r frcm me, he investigated the matter. 
0000120 
I t is my bolief that l&r, Udall has hoard al l of tho charges 
that havo boen made secretly against me and which have been 
used to keep me from working: i t is also my belief 
.that he could verify to the Department of Justice that 
(1) the telephones of my family members have been monitored; 
(2) that television cameras have been placed in my homo, and 
in other locations when the observing of my activities was 
deemed to be necessary to the work of the Cannon Committee; 
(5) he could testify that my mail has been opened, copied, 
circulated and burlesqued between the Deseret News and the 
Salt Lake Tribune\ (h) he is ar/are of at least some of the 
entrapment procedures that have been carried out against me and the 
consequent fact that in order to have gained the cooperation 
of the persons who have assisted the Cannon Committee in 
i t s schemes, i t was necessary for them to have spread criminal 
l ibels and slanders against me; (5) he knows that the 
surveillance of me is a continuous process and has been operating 
for at leant five years* 
She dictionary defines tho verb "to pursue" as meaning 
"to follow with intent to capture or ki l l ." I t is my belief 
that because of the wilful destruction and malicious damage 
that has been inflicted upon my l i fe by i ts members, the 
Cannon Committee has shown that i t i s morally not removed 
from the perpetration of murder by any degree. Unless something 
i s done to dissolve the Committee and to divest the Newspaper 
Agency Corporation of i ts power, the eonseauent loss of l i f e 
could not be doubted* 
OC0I31 
Iho persons responsible for the repeated a t t acks upon 
my repu ta t ion , the harassment and worry, as well as the 
burlesque are 
VJILLIAM S&1RT, Executive Editor of the Deseret News, who 
I have never met and with whom I have never had a personal 
conversat ion, 
RQSELARY PEDERSEN, a society renor ter for the Deseret News 
who I have never met, and to my knowledge have never seen, 
but who a t one time was someone in whom D. James Cannon 
was i n t e r e s t e d . 
EVELYN BLOOD MAZURAN, Society Editor of the Deseret News, 
who was Society Editor when I was a society repor te r for the News, 
from Hay to December in 1953-
D. JAI.S5 Ciuvi.'ON, now employed by a bank, who supplied 
the Committee with my l e t t e r s t o him, which led t o the 
opening and burlesquing of a l l of my mail , 
ELAINE A. CANNON, UT. Cannon's wife , and a repor te r 
for the Deseret News. 
ARTHUR C DECK, Executive Editor of the Sa l t Lake Tribune, 
H£riBi2tT PRICE, Promotion iknager of the S a l t Lake Tribune 
ROBERT TOGDY, Business Editor of the S a l t Lake Tribune 
Newsmen for the CBS Television S ta t ion KSL who have 
burlesqued "bathtub sequences" which served t o inform me t h a t 
the "police procedures" of the Newspaper Agency Corporation 
were a hoax and were being used for lewd purposes a r e 
BOB WELTI and 
PAUL JAMES, both of whom 1 haye never met. 
The name of David Kimball, the hairdresser, must also 
be included here, because i t was a s l ip of his tongue that 
informed roe that he had also been a witness to the television snooping. 
I t goes without saying that i f an indictment is made aGainst 
these persons, i t wil l have to extend to the postmaster of the 
Salt Lake post office* 
0000133 
APPENDIX B: TRUST AGREEMENT 
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1RUST AGREEMENT 
1UIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this A/sJ~ day of June, 1968, 
by and between MARY JEAN FR2EBAIRN hereinafter designated as "First Beneficiary"; 
and SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN and AGM'.S S, KREEEAIRN, his wife, as joint tenants, here-
inafter designated as "Second Beneficiary" «rd SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, hereinafter designated as "Trustee"; 
W I T N E S S E T H 
THAT, WHEREAS, First Beneficiary is the owner of the following described 
raal property, situate in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to-wit: 
^Beginning at a point that is North 89*54*10" West 193.975 feet from 
the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°54,lO" West 10.025 
feet; thence South 8°50'30M West 346.60 feet; thence South 83*18' 
West 311.88 feet; thence North 11°25,20M West 105.45 feet; thence 
Worth 2*57' East 13.16 feet; thence West 402.70 feet; thence South 
1042.492 feet; thence East 25.00 feet; thence South 652.241 feet; 
thence East 961.00 feet to the East line of said Section 2; thence 
North 0°06*54" East along said Section line 2126.105 feet to the 
Westerly line of Wasatch Blvd.; thence along said Westerly line 
Horth 2lP46*25" West 520.315 feet to the point of beginning. Con-
taining 37,6 acres. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described portions thereof: 
BEGINNING at a point that is South 0°06,54" West 1634.485 
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Tcwnship 3 South, 
Range i East Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 0*05' 
54" West along the Section line 322.242 feet; thence West 470.00 
feet; thence North 100.00 feet; thence North 42* East 299.05 feet; 
thence Eest 270.54 feet to the point of BEGINNING. Containing 
2.3 acres. 
ALSO BEGINNING at a point that is South 0,06,54" West along the 
Section line 1956.727 feet and West 470.00 feet from the North-
east corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range I East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 491.00 feet; thence North 595.00 
feet; thence South 28* Ease 627.44 feet; thence East 196.43 feet; 
thence South 41.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing* 
2.97 acres.X 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, ysed upon 
or I D connection with said property. 
SUBJECT TO Easeoents, Restrictions, Reservations and Rights of Way 
appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and t*r.&9 for 
tha year 1968 and th«r«*tr*r. 
AND WHEREAS approximately one year ago First Beneficiary verbally agreed 
to tell and Second Beneficiary verbally agreed*to purchase said premises and 
Second Beneficiary has heretofore caused said property to be platted aid engineered 
and has installed some water lines which have iwteriall/ assisted First Beneficiary 
by enabling First Beneficiary to ful-flll her cestuiensnts to prcvid* water to 
Robert Wilstead and Clifford Green to whom s-ie h;«s heretofore sold a piece of 
.adjoining property, and 
W1EREAS it is now the desire of the parties hereto to enter into this 
written Agreement to facilitate the said sale and purchase of the premises, all 
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth and contained, 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for and in con-
sideration of the mutual covenants, conditions and agreements set forth herein, 
the parties hereto agree as follows: 
I 
First Beneficiary shall and hereby agrees simultaneously with the execution 
hereof to convey said property to Security Title Company as Trustee free and clear 
of all liens and encumbrances other than specifically 6et forth herein, for the 
purpose and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth and contained. 
II 
The Trust herein provided for is established and exists and shall be 
operated for the purpose of carrying out the sale of said property by First Bene-
ficiary to Second Beneficiary and otherwise handling the same to accomplish all 
of the terms and conditions herein provided. Hie Trustee is hereby granted full 
power to do ail acts necessary to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement. 
Ill 
The title in and to the above described property, shall constitute and 
be designated as the "Trust Pioperty". The legal title to said property shall 
be vested in said Trustee, except as hereinafter provided, and no legal interest 
in and to said property shall be vested in either of said Beneficiaries, and their 
and each of their rights hereunder are personal consisting only of the right to 
enforce due performance of the terms and conditions hereof to be performed by the 
other parties hereto. The Beneficiaries have not and shall not have any right or 
power to apply for or secure the dissolution or termination of this Trust Agreement 
or the partition or division of any of the Trust property in any manner except as 
provided for herein. 
IV 
The First Beneficial Interest under this Trust is vested in MARY JEAN 
FREEBAIRN. 
The Second Beneficiary Interest under this Trust is vested in SAMUEL 
K. FREE BAIRN and AGNES S. FREE BAIRN his wife, as joint tenants, 
ALL monies coming into the hands of Trustee for disbursement to the 
First Beneficiary shall be paid to them in accordance with the beneficial interests 
set forth above. 
? 
First Beneficiary agrees to sell and Second Beneficiary agrees to purchase 
the entire Interest in the Trust Property hereinbefore described for the total 
purchase price of NINETY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
($96,990.00) which the Second Beneficiary agrees to pay to the Trustee herein for 
the benefit of the First Beneficiary as follows: 
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The sum of SEVEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($7,000.00) or more 
on the 15th day of June in the year 1969 and the sum of SEVEN 
THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($7,000.00) or more on the 15th day 
of June of each and every succeeding year thereafter until the 
total purchase price has been paid in full. It is expressly 
understood and agreed by the parties hereto that no interest shall 
be charged or paid on the unpaid portion of said purchase price. 
The parties hereto acknowledge that the total purchase price has 
been determined on the basis of $3,000.00 per acre, there being 
a total of 32.33 acres in said trust property. Second Beneficiary 
expressly agrees that there shall not be paid hereunder to First 
Beneficiary in the calendar year 1968 a sum of money in excess of 
29X of the total purchase price of $96,990.00. 
VI 
All taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon and against said 
property for the year 1967 and ail prior years thereto, shall be paid by First 
Beneficiary, all such taxes and assessments for the year 1968 shall be prorated 
between the parties as of June 15, 1968, and all subsequent taxes and assessments 
levied and assessed upon and against said property commencing with the year 1969 
shall be paid by Second Beneficiary. 
In the event Second Beneficiary shall fail to pay before delinquent, any 
such taxes, charges and assessments, First Beneficiary shall have the right to pay 
the same and any payments so made by First Beneficiary shall be prima facie evidence 
of the necessity therefor, and the amounts so paid shall be secured hereby and 
•hall be repaid to First Beneficiary by Second Beneficiary on demand, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent (87.) per annum from the date 
first paid by First Beneficiary until repaid. In the event said Trustee shall 
receive notice in writing from First Beneficiary of any such payments said Trustee 
shall not convey said property, or any part thereof, unless and until the repayment 
thereof, with interest thereon shall have been made. 
VII 
Second Beneficiary shall not, prior to payment in full of the purchase 
price herein provided for, allow any lien or any other claim of any kind or 
nature whatsoever to be imposed upon or against said property which shall 
affect any portion of said property not theretofore released from any claim 
or interest of First Beneficiary as provided for herein. It is expressly 
understood and agreed however that nothing in this paragraph contained shall 
restrict the right of Second Beneficiary to sell said Trust property or any part 
or parcel thereof on a deferred payment basis, it being further understood however, 
that, there being no privity of contract between First Beneficiary and purchasers 
of land from Second Beneficiary, that First Beneficiary shall not in any way be 
obligated to have conveyed title to said Trust property except MS provided for 
herein and shall not in any way be liable or obligated to said purchasers. 
VIII 
Possession of the Trust Property shall be delivered by First Beneficiary 
to Second Beneficiary on June 15, 1968. 
DC 
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right from time to 
time to subdivide portions of the property being sold and purchased hereunder, subject 
nevertheless to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. Second Beneficiary 
shall and hereby agrees to pay all costs and expenses cf said subdividing including, 
but not limited to, surveying, platting, engineering, installation of water and 
•ewer lines, culverting, grading and surfacing of streets and such other off-site 
improvements and utilities as may be required, the intent b»iing that First Beneficiary 
shall be under no obligation or expense in connection therewith. Second Beneficiary 
further agrees to inderanify and save First Beneficiary harmless from any and all less, 
cost or expense which First Beneficiary cay suffer or sustain in connection vith said 
subdividing and improvements Including those heretofore Installed and constructed. 
First Beneficiary is aware of the fact that Second Beneficiary has borrowed 
approximately $15,000,00 from Russell Scott to finance the construction of said 
off-site improvements heretofore installed and Second Beneficiar*y hereby agrees 
to pay the same. Trustee shall have and is hereby given the authority to execute and 
have acknowledged all instruments and documents necessary to have subdivision plats 
fully approved and plnced of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, 
together with the authority to execute upon request of Second Beneficiary any 
subdivision restrictions that Second Beneficiary may desire or require. It is 
agreed that the lots in any subdivisions developed by Second Beneficiary be of 
any sire and acreage which Second Beneficiary may desire. The parties hereto ack-
nowledge the fact that First Beneficiary is retaining title to two parcels of land 
consisting of 2.3 acres and 2.97 acres which are excepted from the Trust Property 
on Page i hereof and adjoin the Trust Property on the Southerly boundary. Second 
Beneficiaries' proposed development involves the construction of a road adjoining the 
same and First Beneficiary hereby agrees, when said road and other off-site improvements 
are installed by Second Beneficiary adjacent to her two retained parcels, to immediatcl) 
pay to Second Beneficiary her proportionate share of the cost thereof. 
X 
Ihe parties hereto acknowledge the fact the Second Beneficiary is purchas-
ing said property for the express purpose of subdividing the same and selling 
building lots. Second Beneficiary has heretofore had said property surveyed and a 
preliminary subdivision plot plan prepared, installed certain of the off-site improve-
ments and now has ready for recording an approved subdivision plat known as Russell 
Park Subdivision affecting a portion of said property namely 6.987 acres and con-
taining 17 subdivision lots. 
The parties hereto recognize the fact that Second Beneficiaries' development 
of said property will necessitate Second Beneficiaries obtaining fee title to said 
property in*order to finance the construction of subdivision and off-site impiovements 
, through a lending institution by means of a first mortgage. Therefore in order to 
pjX^  facilitate and assist Second Beneficiary in their development of said property First 
A ' w Beneficiary hereby agrees, and Trustee is hereby authorized and directed, upon receipt 
+r^ of written request by Second Beneficiary, to convey to Second Beneficiary fee title 
/* to the 6.987 acres which constitute Russell Park Subdivision when Second Beneficiary 
'•*' has obtained financing for the construction of the off-site improvements therefor 
yi* and has presented to the Trustee a mortgage or Deed of Trust to be recorded in the 
^i Salt Lake County Recorder's office. Simultaneously therewith Second Beneficiary 
^ J/** shall and hereby agrees to execute and deliver to Trustee a promissory note and 
a
 Deed of Trust in favor of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary 
in the sum of $20, 961.00 ( said amount being determined by multiplying the number 
of acres in said subdivision by the per acre price of $3,000.00 which Deed of Trust 
shall be so recorded immediately after the recordation of the aforesaid mortgage or 
Deed of Trust for the off-site improvements to the end that said Deed of Trust in 
favor of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary shall be a good 
and valid second Deed of Trust upon said 6.987 acres in a first and superior positio 
over all other Hens and encumbrances except that of the lender providing the first 
mortgage or Deed of Trust financing for the off-site improvements and possible liens 
in connection with the improvements already constructed. 
It is further agreed by the parties hereto that in the event Second Benef-
iciary has paid to the Trustee for the account of First Beneficiary three-fourths of 
the $20,961.00 due to First Beneficiary for the said 6.987 acres and in the event 
Second Beneficiary is not in default hereunder, and especially not In default with 
respect to the $7,000.00 annual payments provided for in Paragraph V above, Second 
Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right to record another subdivision 
plat which shall be contiguous to Russell Park Subdivision and which shall not 
contain more than seven acres. Second Beneficiary shall further be entitled to 
receive a conveyance of said subdivision acreage upon obtaining financing for the 
construction of off-site improvements and executing a note and Trust Deed in favor 
of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary, all in accordance with 
the terms and conditions provided for above. Additional subdivisions, conveyances 
and Deeds of Trust may be had upon the same terms and conditions provided for above 
if all monies due by Second Beneficiary to First Beneficiary have bten paid except 
one-quarter of the atonies due on the last preceding subdivision so conveyed and 
mortgaged, 
XI 
Second Beneficiary when not in default hereunder shall at any time be 
entitled to receive a Special Warranty Deed from the Trustee conveying and releasing 
acreage and/or subdivision lots upon payment by Second Beneficiary to Trustee for 
the account of First Beneficiary as follows: 
(a) One (1) acre of land, or multiples thereof, for each sum of $3,000.00 
paid and applied upon the principal balance due hereunder. 
(b) In the event Second Beneficiary has recorded a subdivision plat or 
plats with respect to any particular portion of said Trust Property and fee title 
has not been conveyed and a second Deed of Trust executed,as provided for in 
Paragraph X above, Second Beneficiary shall be entitled to receive from Trustee 
a conveyance of any one subdivision lot for a sum of money the amount of which shall 
be computed and determined by the use of the following mathantetical formulae: Ihe 
total amount of acreage contained within the exterior boundaries of a particular 
subdivision plat, ms determined by a competent surveyor duly licensed in the State 
of Utah, shall be multipled by the acreage release price hereinbefore specified, 
being the sum of $3,000.00 per acre, thus determining the total amount due to 
First Beneficiary for the particular acreage Involved. The total number of lots 
contained within the said subdivision shall then be divided into the total amount 
of monies due to First Beneficiary and the quotient shall constitute the particular 
release and conveyance price for all of the lots in that particular subdivision 
plat. This formula is based on the presumption that all lots in a particular sub-
division will be of approximately the same size and in the event this is not the 
situation then the actual release price for each particular lot in that subdivision 
shall be determined by the mutual written consent of the parties hereto. Once a 
particular area has been subdivided and a subdivision lot release price thus 
established the said release and conveyance price shall not be changed. 
(c) In the event Second Beneficiary has recorded a subdivision plat or 
plats with respect to any particular portion of said trust property and title has been 
conveyed to Second Beneficiary and a second Deed of Trust has been executed and 
recorded.from Second Beneficiary to Security Title Company as Trustee for First 
Beneficiary as provided for in Paragraph X above, Second Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to receive from Trustee a reconveyance of any one subdivision lot for a 
sum of money to be determined and calculated on the same basis as provided for in 
subparagraph (b) above. 
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right and option 
to select and designate the particular acreage to be so released and conveyed 
provided however, that after the first such selection is made, all future acreage 
and/or subdivisions so designated must be contiguous. Also, it is agreed that 
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right to select any particular 
subdivision lot or lots to be so released and conveyed. Second Beneficiary shall, 
prior to requesting a release and conveyance of any acreage or subdivision plats, 
furnish Trustee and First Beneficiary a certification from a surveyor duly licensed 
In the State of Utah showing the location and amount of acreage in the event 
acreage is so selected for release and conveyance, or in the event of a subdivision, 
e subdivision plat containing a description of the exterior boundary thereof, and 
the amount of total acreage contained therein, to the end that the parties hereto 
and the Trustee may determine with certainty the release and conveyance price to 
be paid by Second Beneficiary as provided for herein. 
(d) All conveyances of acreage shall be free and clear of all encumbrances 
except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued by or through the acts 
of neglect of Second Beneficiary. The parties hereto acknowledge the existence 
of a first mortgage against the premises executed by First Beneficiary in favor of 
Beehive State Bink having an approximate balance of SIXTY ONE HUNDRED* IWE^IY FIVE 
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($6,125.00) which obligation shall remain the obligation 
of and be paid by First Beneficiary to the end that all conveyances of trust property 
to Second Beneficiary shall be free and clear thereof, 
XII 
In the event Second Beneficiary shall fail to comply with any of the 
terms hereof cr fail to make any payment or payments when the same shall become 
due then the First Beneficiary shall have, at her option, the right to serve 
written notice upon Second Beneficiary to remedy tho default within thirty (30) 
dsys after service of such notice, a copy of which sh*ll he served *:pan Trustee 
by First Beneficiary, and should the Second Beneficiary fail to do so, then 
and in tnat event, ail right, title and interert of Second Beneficiary in and 
to said Trust property shall terminate without further nefcte* *11 mt»4o«; th*rOr*(0T'-
paid by Second Beneficiary shall be retained by First Beneficiary as rent and 
liquidated damages and as consideration for the establishment of this Trust and 
all property theretofore released and conveyed, and Second Beneficiary agrees that 
First Beneficiary may re-enter and take possession of all property not theretofore 
paid for or released and conveyed, with or without legal process, together with 
all improvements and additions made by the Second Beneficiary thereon, which 
improvements and additions shall remain with the land and become the property of 
First Beneficiary.Second Beneficiary becoming at once a tenant at will of First 
Beneficiary, and in the event that possession of said property is not delivered 
to First Beneficiary upon demand,Second Beneficiary shall be subject to ail statutory 
actions for unlawful detainer. The interest of Second Beneficiary hereunder shall 
be deemed terminated when written notice thereof, after expiration of said 30 day 
period, has been filed with the Trustee for the First Beneficiary. In addition 
and in the event of such default and termination, Second Beneficiaries shall and 
hereby agree, within ten (10) days thereafter, to execute and deliver to Trustee 
a Quit Claim Deed conveying to Trustee all of their right, title and interest in 
and to that portion of said property not theretofore deeded to Second Beneficiary. 
Trustee shall, upon receipt of written notice from First Beneficiary, after the 
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, of Second Beneficiary's default and 
upon request of First Beneficiary and without liability to anyone, convey by 
Special Uarranty Deed to First Beneficiary all property not theretofore conveyed 
which remainsvested in Trustee. First Beneficiary shall also have the right, at 
its option, in the event Second Beneficiary fails to remedy its default within 
the thirty (30) day period above provided, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
due hereunder at once due and payable, treat this Agreement as a note and mortgage 
or Deed of Trust, have the Trustee convey to Second Beneficiary title to all of the 
property not theretofore conveyed to Second Beneficiary and proceed immediately 
to foreclose the ssme in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah and have 
the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
provided howtver, that First Beneficiary shall not in any event have the right or 
be entitled to have a judgment against Second Beneficiary for any deficiency which 
may remain. 
It is further understood and agreed that any default by Second Beneficiary 
in the terms and conditions herein contained shall constitute a default with 
respect to any and all notes and deeds of trusts executed by Second Beneficiary to 
Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary in connection with the 
conveyance of acreage contained within a subdivision plat for the financing of 
off-site improvements as provided for In Paragraph X above and First Beneficiary, 
shall have and is hereby given the right and option to foreclose the same pursuant 
to the statutes of the State of Utah, provided however that First Beneficiary shall 
not in any event be entitled to obtain or have a judgment against Second Beneficiary 
for any deficiency which may remain, 
XIII 
It is covenanted and agreed by the First Beneficiary that her sole 
remedy against the Second Beneficiary, in the event of default, is the right to 
terminate this agreement in the manner hereinbefore provided, excepting that 
First Beneficiary has a right of action against Second Beneficiary for the amount 
of any unpaid taxes or other assessments as of the date of such termination, and for 
any loss, cost and expense suffered or sustained by reason of any liens or en-
cumbrances against the Trust Property which is repossessed or foreclosed upon by 
Second Beneficiary,, 
XIV 
As between First Beneficiary and Second Beneficiary it is agreed that 
should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement MS provided 
for herein., 
.6-
XV 
Hie Beneficiaries Jointly and severally agree that they will fully 
pay, indemnify and protect, save and hold harmless the Trustee of and from 
any and all suits, claims, demands, judgments, costs or expenses, including 
attorney's fees and other obligations and liabilities of whatever nature that 
the Trustee may for any reason or at -any time suffer, sustain, incur or expend 
by reason of or in connection with this Trust or the administration thereof 
otherwise than through its own misconduct or neglect. Said Beneficiaries 
further agree that the Trustee shall not be required to pay or attend to the 
payment of any claim, lien or encumbrance, including but not limited to taxes, 
income, inheritance or estate taxes, or special assessments against the Trust 
property unless instructed so to do and proceeds are received and made available 
for such' payment, shall not be required to attend, to any assessment or valuation 
of the property but all such services shall be performed and all expenses borne 
by the Beneficiaries or their representatives. 
The parties hereto further agree that the Trustee shall not be required 
to commence or defend any suit in connection with this Trust or the Trust property 
without its express written consent and unless and until there shall have been 
paid to the Trustee a sum of money sufficient in its judgment to pay all costs 
incurred or to be incurred in relation thereto including attorney's fees and a rea-
sonable compensation to the Trustee for its services and the time of its officers and 
employees spent in connection therewith. 
As between First Beneficiary and Second Beneficiary, it is agreed that 
all of the obligations of the Beneficiaries in this Section set forth are the 
obligations of Second Beneficiary; provided, however, that the Trustee may look 
to both of said Beneficiaries or any property or funds in its hands fcr the 
compliance therewith ana to indemnify it and hold it harmless on account of 
failure to make any payment to or to do any act that is hereinbefore set forth. 
XVI 
No person dealing with the Trustee shall be obligated to ascertain 
whether or not the Trustee has exceeded its powers in any act it may perform or 
cause to be performed incident to or in connection with its administration of 
this Trust and the property described herein or any part or percel thereof, nor 
to see to the proper handling, application, or disbursement by the Trustee of 
any funds paid to the Trustee. 
XVII 
All instruments affecting any property Included In this Trust shall 
be executed by SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee; provided, however, that the . 
Trustee at its option may cause or permit such instrument to be executed by 
some other person or corporation. The Trustee shall not be obligated to warrant 
title to any property sold or conveyed by it except as against its own acts. Any 
Deeds executed by the Trustee shall be made subject to any taxes, assessments, 
liabilities or obligations existing against the Trust property at the time of said 
conveyance. 
XVIII 
The ofcouctteg records or the Trustee shall at all reasonable times 
M.frrr f# rw l! i fT€ , l o # .vr iK# ^rt ,f! i«r«r#.t*d <• this m^t 0*17. TH* *<*#. 
riclafWi »<*U U c«(tlU<€ to |-c;ti>*u tUtraratt St<m cW Truft»« fefc^viog ai l 
CU t t u t p t l •** 4UV?tft«sc*tf eoJ c-**r;tft etd* la coeatttlo* vitb t i t* Trosr. 
XIX 
Ko •islrjocot or transfer of any interest of any party hereunder at any 
tice shall be valid and blodicg upon the Trvstce until an executed original of 
the assignment or other instrument evidencing the transfer has been filed with 
end accepted by the Trustee and the Trustee's assignment fee paid therefore 
.7, 
lug oiiU w h c* e s u c h interett may pass or be transferred by decree or 
»f the t*lurt a n d t n c n o n* v uP o n satisfactory proof of the regularity and 
V of th* proceedings in such matter being presented to the Trustee. 
XX 
jhfji Trust shall be exempt from the provisions and operations of 
wform ft lacipal «n<* £«come Act of Utah. 
jhl> Trust shall terminate upon conveyance of all of the property 
Trusted *n accordance with the provisions hereof, and the distribution 
of the funds In the hands of the Trustee to the person or persons 
ad then*0 *" accordance with the terms hereof. In the event said 
y has tot o e c n conveyed by the Trustee within one year after the time 
%i*d in f«*r«Creph V for the last payment due to First Beneficiary the 
may >' i o o n thereafter as practicable and upon payment of all of 
~*s co*!** charges and damages for which it may become liable, convey 
••perty <** t n e Second Beneficiary if the Second Beneficiary shall have 
*# purcVst price in full and any other amounts due and owing to First 
tiary, *n t n e e v e n t said purchase price and any other amounts due 
•Ing to T i r s t Beneficiary shall not have been paid prior to said date, 
-u*tee sV1** have the right to institute an action in a Court of com-
jurisd^tion t 0 determine the rights of the respective Beneficiaries 
*
 convey t n e property in accordance with the decree entered in said 
i jhen f ^ decree shall become final and the statuatory time for appeal 
„:«t ylMS paired. In the event of any such action being brought by the 
«« the ' T u s t e e shall have a first and prior lien against the said 
-r ?v for it3 attorney's fees and all costs and reasonable payment for 
2* of it* officers and employees in connection therewith. 
XXI 
jt A agreed that time is the essence of this Agreement. 
XXII 
41jnot i ces provided for herein shall be in writing and served 
' ly OT **v deposit ing the same in the United States mail as cert i f i ed 
h rer*rn receipt requested, and with postage pre-paid and shall be 
:miplr'i upon the date the same i s delivered to the addressee as disclosed 
retur* rece ip t . All not ices to First Beneficiary shall be mailed to 
N rRv-3AIRN at /felSsuK 3** JT*s/ &*£.*&&&<; t-ClZ-A. 
notir* t o Second Beneficiary shal l be mailed to SAMUEL/4. FREEBA1RN and 
FPXyAIRN at / / /£»/ c /* /> /» /& / ) , ? ; • ? Sr^^fi<^ik <XX?, /sW> 
notir* to Trustee shal l be addressed to SECURITY TITLft? COhtfAKY at 330 East 
->uth . 5 a l t Lake City, Utah. I t i s agreed by the Beneficiaries herein 
., y^Cher singular or plural , that the above named persons respect ively 
afk4 re hereby appointed and designated -as their representatives 2nd th i t 
,f pr ice to them shal l cons t i tute and be service of notice to a l l said 
*rie* 
XXIII 
j t a tioderetood and agreed by the BeneffcUrles that Security Ti t le 
It* jitUmr* mnd r*»lo}*c» rvika 00 rapraicotarloat or recencndaitoas 
•re •» s s W f t # | * f i f # Urn «o*4 l t l»« , | t t r a U a or des i rab i l i t y , or eoy 
?rt «*iUUtftg tfccrtto; iHat co sa les or promotional cas^etga* or 
4 . | * say U a d t ! u l l includt the M = » of Security Tit le Corpany at taking 
i ^ cat i t l oas . provided, hovcvcr, that the sase may disc lose the fact 
r: :*Tit le Cospaay i s act ing as Trustee and v i i l issue t i t l e insurance 
a.) such advert is ing and a l l not ices shal l c lear ly show that the 
> t ot the ir agents are the authors thereof and the Itustee shall not 
fa:any s tateoents or representations made therein. 
jotiv 
;• s agreed by the part ies hereto that this Trust Agreement nav be 
• ptncled, provided, however, that said modifications end amendments 
J: s i t i n g and shal l be approved and accepted by the Beneficiaries and 
executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed and delivered 
this Agreement the day, month and year first above written. 
f 
P 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN 
SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN 
g ? ^ » f ^ ^ ^ ^ 
~r AGNES S. FREEBAIRN ^ "i^L 
ACCEPTED BY 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
330 East Fourth South. Salt Lake City, Utah 
By: 
By: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE • 
) 
) S8, 
) 
On the «3A^ day of June, A.D., 1968, personally appeared before me 
KARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, a woman, the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowled-
ged to me that she executed the same. 
IS 
Residing in: - S - ^ * £ " ^ 6/f l&s<. 
My Conmission Expires: H-22-7/ 
Wotary Public r 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the day of June, A.D., 1968, personally appeared before me 
SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN and ACNES S. FREEBAIRN, his wife, the signers of the within 
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
Residing in: 
My Consul is ton Expires: 
Notary Public 
10-
APPENDIX C: EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
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• 
• 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
Thit may b# a Ugotly birring form, if not undtutood took othtr odvict 
LeR Burton, Realtor Salt Lake City
 utatt January 13 71 
mM...OC.M,- . r - . , * • « * * _ ^ ^ * . « ^ M ^ * « . . -*, . , - Scott investment Corporation 
, « . . . 2 0 0 . 0 0 . TWO HUNDRED AND hD/lQQ ^ 
« * m mm « Check made direct to seller, Mary Jean Freebairn 
• * — - . — ., . ,—— M M . — ^ ,. As described in the attached Exhibit "A" wtlch hv this refp.rftnr.P 
• Is made a part of this agreement. All of mv interest In said property Is to be r^nveygd to 
, seller on or about February 1. 1971 and not later than Mrarh I. 1971 
• i • • i . • . i , . . i 
Salt Lake
 toit,tttill< Utah 
l i i M M « * « Mr K m taitowtMj M M M M *t M M M I M I M M * to «M w w i m M M H < M MM l n t i i « f t i tMM MM «t«iM>aat MftaKMj M M M M M Ml M a u • a i t r l u i i n . M l M f u r i 
U «Mtt*H Utm Uttarm MM . . . 
No exceptions 
M T» MM-<M M ~ .
 m M H k *•*** » « « « . . ^ >ar^ M<: none. Buyer may elect to rpfrke payments In 
. . e x c e s s Of t h o s e out l ined be low with A nnnr.vspnnri.ng rpdnntinn nf prtnrtpal ir AnH intoroct 
.« payne nts to follow 
. - . 5 7 , 2 0 0 » FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND*3Q5ff TWO HUNDRED ft N O / i n n
 M l U k M 
1 2 0 0 . 0 0 •i.u.. • • • i . MM. MMMiMi.fi MMMMI.
 WW)f<^MMhM#iiitii»yw<h>. & b y s e l l e r 
. ^ . 2 7 5 . 0 0 M #MIM»> tf «M* « 
J O MM t>ftttt *Mll M M) M M*M»*I£ 
arch 1 ,.71 ^ , 275,00 ^^,»—.,,» 3Q dgyg after PQESteslpn 
., which shall be interest only on the unpaid balance. Beginning with the first month of the 
,» eleventh year the buyer shall pay the monthly amount that will amortise the then remaining 
.» b a l a n c e over a period of an addit ion*! 1 9.0 months togpthpr with intPrectt nn tho imp^.H Kalanro 
"
 d t
 .V16 r a t . e o f 6 % peJ a n n u m « There are certain debts which are assumed bv th* hnypr whirh 
„ will not decrease the interest payment for the first 10 years even though their payment will ^ » -
„ reduce the principal balance, and these payment are limited to the following•(!) Property t a ^ s •* 
*f MH.I M» t t U M t « I M t l l t a i » J U MMTM4 « M M . I M i M . MMNT. IMkt MflMf M t i t M*M*. II M|r ( • • • m»j a a . • • • • a l l , ! * w i W l .a/ I M J M U I ) 
c except as described^-
ftl » i r * M K « H I I k t . M W . I I i l l M l MIIM1 It It* llto<Uti«M * mt MtrtMM M MMTMT fe» U » MJMr MjrM« t M M t t l . MMfMl t l V , % MT *MMt M IM MM** MT>>M« M tt» 
,. -otherwise in this agreement. _ _ Feb l 71 
a » M K k t M »'•(• I* St I B . , . ! * • • Ik* M * * " * * * M»*«*T> MM Mali M f l t M M « • ! • t * f M « M « « Vtucfc t M I I »• M *- * • ! • * • « ^ * ^ * I t / * 
r i u •? M M l M U M I I M 
fcO • • » * M ' l | t * 4 a»MM*t •« > « M i M ( Mall M M M . to/ I t* Ml tor «•!•( !««« «t > »•« at «hi<k t i a * w w r t t Uaat . t««U M M T H « I U I U ' M I M I Mtwi «4««*««» •( «M r « M « t i I M H 
SI M »rtr»U4 * i •< M l • ( t n M I I •« All l lk*r U t M M « »lt M M M M I t . M a r t M f t l • M i l * I tM** m*t M M !•«•» •*«•»»»»»«« •* ( f t<r f , l t | * I M \ tM) pr«»«'t» «t M l H K f l I M H M M>4 
S I M I M M»Mf • M M t : 
No exceptions 
> > V M U I « M < M | H n u l i a » r i M M » l i M» U t t M M M » • « M H . M*«f Q — C M M « » M Q M » l u T*ak M M / M C * * » M « I Q »M«««lk Q C w * M 4 6«tt«» H *Mt««l l U M l 
AS now EXISTS
 f ^ 
»» Canfrert of Sol* or tnttrumont of conveyance to b« mod* on th« opprovod form of tno Utah Stoto Socuritiot Convni»»ion m f f» nam* of 
, . Scott Investment Corporation 
1 « U MTMMl «l N N i t M M 4 « H « 4« M J 4 M*|Mt U IM *f l t«M MM»l»«t« •« IM MtMl M W W M M •»**»• « * r ««MJ MM MTM«, U 4 
4 IM r*lMB M IM • > • » M*«*« fM^'MM MMtl M M l i I t l l »»M OllMM «M»«I« It IM MMMttMMl M M ! 
I t IM «*«tt IM MTlMM' U . H M MV M l M l l l l l *t M l »MMjtM M(M m MM9MU M i l MTOMMt M M»t«t MMMM). MM f l t t l l 9*+ MJTMt MM I. M t M »M»M M I 
41 II M M l W t l M j MM M ' M t *M» IM Mr»t M H t M M ! •»• fM«t«l WMtilwU IM M I M » Pr»liMlMr» C t t t l t t l MIVtM IM MTIMMr MM IM MIMr. MM IMt M MTMl tMlMkMl M M 
4 2 •> M M M »M*ti*< M l t .» *••**<! . •» M i l M MMtruM M M * MTl M Mi l IrMMttiM « M H W M M r M M *• f^V>«* M r i l t l t l » iMMMt MVMt IM4 i t M l m •( IM t lMl M t U M l Mwll 
« S b V N i K »»•• ( v t w l • • • » » ••««•»< mat Ollar to r>M*MM * — i - ^ / " N / / -y 
^ _ AM.. », p i W . \ Q^o^J^xj. T.fiR Rnrtontf Realtor 
4 » * t M MTM» MTM It Mrry M* MM tM^lM MM MfMI MM MMitMM MMllwJ MM»l. M< «M MltM M T M to i M t l M M M M l MMtMMW ll l te » < U MMWMl M M M I k l t d « M M U M T ' I 
« * M t > M t M l x y M lilt* i t u i M H It IM M M t4 IM M 1 M M M l It M l l»Ml MMtyMM M »MTMKy M M M _ 
4 7 M IM t v t t t 0t MM t l M M MM fMl M»MT|». MlMr •III M***M awiMM* 01 lilto M • • • » ! M Mil M M M II I l l M MTl« U>M M It M. fet MJTMt It Mf Ml MMMM M M^MttMJ 
4 t l M t t f M > t t l M M aty /«•»( a/>«.«« M l •* IM MaMfc IMraal. i«ctMl<«| t n M M M alter M i « »M 
I * I M Mitof M « M « M M«t>««raiHM M IM allarii *f tM M«at ta H M W H | t M»«a*Mr. to M M M M«at t MttaitMiM M M I M IM M n « M I M M M M M> IM t u t t M * O M T I 
0 0 ft M U N I I t IM t | M l MJM> M* waiatal Itto • I I M J M t M l t k l » H t Mr f*Mr U W « M atM a»aira«l I* V M I I I > »II«C1>M. U . t M / a t u t f * »•»' M at M I M M M MMtt 
A copy of all the papers and work wi l l be l i lea In the office of LamarDuncan 
«. . (] , ' Scott Investnent Corpi 3-
>u ^ py ^resident on home at 1503 South Third East. (2) Curb and Gutter assessments for same property (3) 
a judgement and costs in the amount of approx $1240 presently existing against seller. 
(4) Back taxes to the state of Utah that are limited to those now outstanding and are in the 
approximate amount of 44250 .00 . It i s understood that buyer i s to pay J. Russell Scott $8,000 
for money he h g | invested in subject property which debt i s separate from those listed above 
and for whicWbuje r has recieved credit as a reduction from the purchase price. All of the intere 
of the seller in Russell park Development Corporation i s hereby assigned to LeR Burton as 
consideration for the effecting of this tranaction. The purdiase of this property is by an 
agreernfeit to buyer and seller and the Deed is to be given on possession date without any of the 
subject property acting as security for future payments. All of the rights and benefits to seller 
arising as a part of this agreement are to be placed in a protective trust for the purpose of safe-
guarding the asse t s and welfare of the seller to the extent that the income she needs for persona! 
welfare cannot be preyed upon by others. J. Russell Scott i s to act personally as trustee for 
such trust und to recle\eall money and dlsparse it according to the instruction of the trust 
with general outline to be $200 per month to seller including taxes and $75.00 to current b i l l s . 
• » IMau IM M M t tn*Mt 
M 9 ft If ft IMM M l If W ' l J M M U * MjTMCMSt MMTM4 Ml 
1/13/71 
I I MMj MMJ «f MM iMMt'MJ MJTMMMt MMtMJ Ml MftMlMM «t M MMMJ It «M Q *MMf. Q «*MMMMr. M 
>chibit "A" For agreement of Sale to Scott Investment Corp. To be used to include descrip-
ion of land which is approximately 25 acres ana is arrivad at by taking the ongional amount 
sold to Sam Freebairn and subtracting only that portion which has already been deeded to 
UisseU Park Development Corp, 
/ -
the following described 
reel property, eituete In the County of Selt Lake, Stete of Utah, to-wlt: 
Beginning et a point that is North 89*54'10" West 193.975 feet from 
the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base end Meridian; thence North 89*54'10" West 10.025 
feet; thence South 8*50f30" West 346.60 feet; thence South 83"18( 
West 311.88 feet; thence North 11*25*20" West 105.45 feet; thence 
North 2*37' East 13.16 feet; thence West 402.70 feet; thence South 
1042.492 feet; thence East 25.00 feet; thence South 652.241 feet; 
thence East 961.00 feet to the East line of said Section 2; thence 
North 0*06*54" East along aaid Section lint 2126.105 feet to the 
Westerly line of Wasatch Blvd.; thence along*aaid Westerly line 
North 21*46'25M West 520.315 ftet to the point of beginning. Con-
taining 37.6 acres. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described portions thereof: 
BEGINNING at a point that is South 0*06'54" West 1634.465 
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 Soath, 
Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 0*06* 
54" West along the Section line 322.242 feet; thence West 470.00 
feet; thence North 100.00|feet; thence North 42* East 299.05 feet; 
thence East 270.54 feet to the point of BEGINNING. Containing 
2.3 acres. 
ALSO BEGINNING at a point that is South 0*06'54" West along the 
Section line 1956.727 feet and West 470.00 feet from the North-
east corner of Section 2, (Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 491.00 feet; thence North 595.00 
feet; thence South 28* East 627.44 feet; thence Eaat 196.43 feet; 
thence South 41.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 
2.97 acree. 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, s-sed upor 
or In connection with aaid property. 
• • • 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions, Reservations and Rights of Wa> 
appearing of record or enforceable in lav and equity and taxes fot 
A P P E N D II' I1 I ' k T ' J ' I O N ]<OU A l ' I ' ' ' I M I'M" P I •'! I ' U A R D J A N 
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Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r 
706 P h i l l i p s petroleum B2dg. 
Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 6I4IOI 
Telephone: 32&-?689 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Uke County Utah 
; QigL Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST; T C" "TAK 
IN AID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTX 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE HATTER OF THE ESTATE AND 
GUARDIANSHIP OF MARY JEAN FRESBAI C 
an inconpetent 
PETITION FOB APPOINTMENT 
OF GUARDIAN i>?o^o 
TO THE HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATS OF UTAH 
The p e t i t i o n of J . RUSSELL SCOTT, of S a l t Lake City, S a l t Lake County, 
S t a t e of Utah, r espec t fu l ly r e p r e s e n t s ; 
3: • 
That the Pe t i t ioner is; the cousin ur k'MlI JE (!! N FREEH* IRN, ail j acorzpete i t , , 
now of t h e a P < < -ii f«•• t v - K « w n VH.4m , 
1V~., u..t „.« t^ - K..- wi-v i'K-.-"^^-* - , - * . • - . . ; - * j been na r r i ed j 
aa i x^  ' . f l : v u i t a l^ro
 v~~ >s i - . ^ a t l e ^ *r:?,r, TI* *.* H aj&c;'. %ance of so:ig other 
pers'-;.;« *o nr^yprly manage -ino Ccire for her proper*,*/, -r. c -A r e ^ o j whereof, 
wou3,i t ? l i k s ' y s"r be deceived nr imposed upon by a r t f u l or des ign:or 'oersons. 
3. 
That tha sa id incompetent b •*.*> ar. e s t a t e wi th in the Countv : f $Ji'\ Lsi.e 
cons i s t ing of cash and r e a l :.»rcjperty, «aa- a::- ^ r . r r t i n ^ . A.-premisst^:?..7 the 
sura of $100.00; tha t the- i n t e r s t -! - *.:- scid UARY JEAN FRESBALRN in trvi rr .al 
property which i s raw, imdeveloped ground,, su i t ab l e fo r subdividing i n t o hons 
B i t e s , i s of tha approximate value of $57*000*00j t h a t sa id p roper ty has an an-
nual r e n t a l value of approximately 5600.00; tha t .in add i t i on t he r e to sa id i n -
ccopetent i s t„v- v^iur: m le^ s j . ^ 1 ^ cf p, c e r t a in hoae i n which she aorr .resides 
a t 1503 5outr j rd iSast Strer- l , ^J.c Lak* Ci ty , Utah, of the approxi2g.te value 
of $12,OOQ4OGJ t-hat -said hom i.is an ar*:u;jL r e n t a l value of $900 .00* 
I*. 
That the only immediate relatives of the said M All JEAN FREE3£IH:% -' 
following* 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
LALIA JUNE FREE3AIRN, a s i s t e r , who resides a t 1511 South 3rd, East, Salt 
lake City, Utah. 
JOHN HAMILTON PffiSBAIRH, JH., a brother, who resides at 2006 East Crystal 
Avenue., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
AGNES STAM FREEBAJEJ, a sister-in-law, who .resides a t 11181 Jupiter Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah; thai the said i!ART JEAN FKEEBAIRW resides at 1503 So2fn 
3rd East in Salt Lake Hit)', Utah 
That the Petitioner .1 hll'flELL SCOTT, resides at 431 South 3rd East in 
Suit L-iki City, lit ih, 
5 i 
i'nat i t us necessary MMI ,ioma f.it and proper person UJ appointed the 
guardian of said inconpetatit, tu can fur arid properly maaagu the properties 
and estate of said incoapeti.utj mat, tnpre has xu t been appointed any perse-i or 
persons AS such guardian b,y law t\r by WM] or by deed or cthe:rwis©« 
I 
That the Petitioner herein as a cousin of eaid inconpetent, i s entitled, 
to Letters of Guardianship of the estate of said incompetentj that the saic 
JOHN HUHIffOH FREEBAIRN, a brother, LALLA FBSEBA1RN, a 8 in ter , and AGNES ST Ail 
FREERAIRNj a sister-in-law, have all consented that Petitioner aci a:s such 
guardian, 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that notice of th is application be given i n 
the manner designs,ted by this Court and a time be set for the hearing of this 
application and pet i t ion, <u;d that upon the hearing and proofs to be .adduced, 
"that said pet i t ion 'be granted and that Letters, of Guardianship issue to hia and 
that such other order may "be made as to the Court may seers i-e-aflonable and rroper 
in the premises* ^ 
"*"""*** PETITIONER 
ATTORNEY. FOR PETITIONER 
STATE OF UTAH 
COU.JTY OF SALT UKB.SS 
J , KJS3ELL SCOTT, being f i r s t duly sworn, deposes and says : tha t 
he i s the p e t i t i o n e r named i n and who subscribed the foregoing p e t i t i o n ; t h a t he 
has read sa id p e t i t i o n , .knows toe contents thereof and t h a t the same i s t rue 
of iii s own knowledge* 
I ^ yf-yL^CT 
Subscribed arid, sworn t o bef . * ct r c c r u a r / j „ H? * 
I res ide i n Ss-Rriaake Ci ty , U &ah 
Ky commission expires Ju ly 28LD, J" 
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APPENDIX r .
 V E R I F I E D A N S W E R Q F S C Q T T 
(Original Exhibit was executed, notarized dad 
certified, The copy included here is i denti cal bi it not 
execu t ed, no t a r i z ed <• ri certified ,) 
M-
LA MAR DUNCAN 
A t t o r n e y f o r G u a r d i a n 
8 1 8 K e a r n s B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 1 
T e l e u h o n e 32 8 - 2 55 3 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
Ski T LAI<S COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
) 
THE CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORE, 
I N C . , dba WEINSTOCK'S, ) A N S W E R 
P l a i n t i f f , } C i v i l No . £''- " "L (" ~^^~ 
v s . ) 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, ) 
Defendant, ) 
Comes now Defendant above named and through her duly ap-
pointed, qualified, and acting Guardian, J. Russell Scott, of 
the person and estate of the said Mary Jean Freebairn, and 
answers Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
1. 
Admits Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. 
Denies Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint on the 
ground that Defendant is wholly incompetent and unable to com-
prehend the meaning of the contract heretofore entered into and 
therefore said contract is a nullity. 
3. 
Further answering and by way of an affirmative answer, here-
tofore, on the 22nd day of March, 1971, the above-entitled Court 
in Probate No. 5 769 3, adjudicated the Defendant an incompetent, 
because of certain mental disorders; that Defendant is therefore 
unable to enter into any contract whatsoever and the attempts on 
the part of Plaintiff are null and void. 
Wherefore, Defendant prays that Plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Attorney for Guardian 
-2-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT FAKE ) 
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he i s the d uly appointed, qua1i f ied, a nd acting Guardian 
of the person and estate of MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN., an incompetent; 
that he has read the foregoing Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, 
knows the contents thereof and that the statements therein con-
tained are true of his own knowledge, information, and belief. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of November, 
1982. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
I reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
My commission expires: 
August 11, 1986 
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LA MAR DUNCAN 
Attorney for Defendants 
818 Kearns Building 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101 
Telephone 328-2 553 
t U £ D !H CLEWS OFFIOf 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
Iter "3 I 56WW 
;H. WJCON HINDLEY CLERK 
r 5«o OIST. COURT. 
IIY-'„; , • - - _ ^ -
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
III 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, Etc., & 
LeR BURTON, et al, 
Defendants. 
A N S W E R 
C i v i l No. C-83-2731 
Come now Defendants and for answer to Plaintiff's Complaint 
on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
1. 
Answering Paragraph 1, Defendant, J. RUSSELL SCOTT, states 
that he, as a first cousin of Plaintiff, was, at the request and 
urging of Plaintiff, appointed Guardian of Plaintiff, an incom-
petent. 
2. 
Admit Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, andr5 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
3. 
Deny Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
4. 
Answering Paragraph 7, Defendants allege that the primary 
business of Scott Investment Corporation was and is investments. 
5. 
Admit Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
6. 
Defendants deny any urging on the part of Defendant Scott 
and allege the ward Freebairn did all the urging. 
7. 
Deny Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
8. 
Admit Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint and further 
allege that she is still incompetent and subject to acts of 
artful and designing persons. 
9. 
Admit Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
10. 
Deny allegations in Plaintiff's Paragraph 13 that the 
ward signed the closing paper on March 1, 1971; admit rest of 
Paragraph 13. 
11. 
Deny Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, through 
Paragraph' 62. 
12. 
Admit Paragraphs 63, 64, and 65 of Plaintiff's 10th Cause 
of Action. 
13. 
Admit Paragraph 66 of Plaintiff's 11th Cause of Action. 
-3-
14. 
Deny Paragraphs 67 through Paragraph 72 of Plaintiff's 
voluminous and wordy Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed; that Defendant, J. Russell Scott, as the only living 
and caring relative, either be continued as Guardian of Plain-
tiff or that some other suitable person or institution that has 
no artful design upon the welfare or property of Plaintiff be 
appointed to continue to-act as her Guardian. 
-Attorney for Defendants 
' /f 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the >^  day of May, 1983, personally appeared before 
me, j m RUSSELL SCOTT, one of the Defendants and the signer of 
the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
a\a » /--/f^V^^^^""c^^ 
^/ NOTARY PUBLIC 
I r e s i d e i n Sal^b^Iiake C i t y , Utah . 
My commission expires: 
August 11, 1986 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : PROBATE NO. 57693 
vs. : 
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, : 
Defendant. 5 
The above-entitled matter was tried on the 12th day of 
January, 1988. Plaintiff was present and represented by Brian M. 
Barnard and Timothy C. Houpt. Defendant was present and 
represented by David J. Jordan. The Court heard the testimony of 
witnesses and admitted documentary evidence. At the conclusion 
of the trial the Court advised counsel that closing arguments 
would be continued to a future date. On the 29th day of January, 
1988, counsel for the respective parties made their closing 
arguments* The Court took the matter under advisement. The 
Court having had an opportunity to review its notes, the 
Memoranda on file, the exhibits admitted, and the pertinent 
authorities cited, now renders its decision. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are first cousins who inherited 
real property located near the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon 
from their uncle. 
FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. Defendant inherited 400 acres and plaintiff inherited 
60 acres from their uncle. 
3. Plaintiff, during the 1960 's, sold 15 acres to 
defendant. 
4. Plaintiff in 1968, entered into a trust agreement with 
her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes Freebairn for the 
purpose of developing their respective properties. 
5. Samuel Freebairn encumbered the land by a mortgage in 
favor of Beehive State Bank for $50,000.00. 
6. Samuel Freebairn died on July 30, 1969, and as a result 
of his death Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop the property 
or make the payments on the mortgage or pay the property taxes. 
7. The 1968 trust agreement was prepared by Herbert 
Halliday, attorney for Security Title Co., who was charged with 
the administration of the trust. 
8. At the time of the creation of the 1968 trust agreement 
there was no evidence presented that at that time plaintiff was 
not competent to contract. 
9. The 1968 trust was terminated by plaintiff and Agnes 
Freebairn in March of 1971. Mr. Halliday handled the 
termination, but did not make a determination as to plaintiff's 
mental status at that time. 
FREEBAIRN V* SCOTT PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
10. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn, facing the risk of 
losing the property which was the subject matter of the 1968 
trust agreement, agreed to sell the property. 
11. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn contracted with LeR 
Burton to sell the property. Mr. Burton listed the property for 
sale on the multiple listing book, and advertised the same in a 
newspaper of state-wide circulation. 
12. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn established an asking 
price, and sought out defendant to purchase the property. 
13. Defendant on January 13, 1971 entered into an Earnest 
Money Agreement with Scott Investment Corporation, owned by 
defendant, and Agnes Freebairn for the sale and purchase of 
approximately 25 acres for $65,000.00, with interest at the rate 
of 6% per annum. 
14. Plaintiff had transacted a number of loans and sales of 
parcels of land prior to this particular transaction, and there 
was no evidence presented that she didn't understand the nature 
of the transactions, 
15. The Earnest Money Agreement provided, among other 
things, as follows: 
••to be placed in a protective trust for the 
purpose of safeguarding the assets and 
welfare of the seller to the extent that the 
income she needs for personal welfare cannot 
be preyed upon by others.5I 
FREEBAIRN V, SCOTT PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
16. Prior to the closing LaMar Duncan, attorney, was 
consulted by plaintiff and defendant regarding the creation of 
the trust for the sale proceeds. Mr. Duncan recommended that 
instead of the trust, a guardianship be created. 
17. The closing for the sale of the property took place on 
March 1, 1971. 
18 , The guardianship was created and defendant was named 
guardian for plaintiff on March 22, 1971. 
19. On March 23, 1971 plaintiff executed a warranty deed in 
favor of Scott Investment Corporation, and retained no security 
interest in the property despite the fact that defendant was to 
make monthly payments for the purchase of the property. 
20. In January of 1972 defendant exchanged the land 
acquired from plaintiff in a four-way trade, In the exchange, 
the defendant received the land under or around the Metro 
Building located at 431 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
having a value of $76,000.00. 
21. The property sold by plaintiff to Scott Investment 
Corporation^ who in turn conveyed the property to defendant was 
exchanged for the Metro Building property. 
22. The party who obtained the property, formerly owned by 
plaintiff, in the four-way exchange sold the subject property 
within two years for $6,000.00 per acre, 
FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
23. Real estate values increased dramatically immediately 
after the subject sale. 
24. The land sold by plaintiff to defendant in 1971 was 
retroactively appraised by two appraisers for this lawsuit and 
they established values for the property in 1971 as being 
$3,100.00 and $5,500.00 per acre. 
25. Plaintiff during her adult years had transacted a 
number of land transactions, conducted her own business affairs, 
attended college, was employed by the Deseret News, Salt Lake 
Tribune and Brigham Young University. 
26. Plaintiff has been diagnosed as a paranoid 
schizophrenic. 
27. Plaintiff is intelligent and educated, and could 
factually understand the sale of property. 
28. Plaintiff is not a good manager of her personal 
finances, but she has personally managed her finances, even 
though the court had appointed a guardian for her. 
29. Plaintiff received all of the payments from defendant 
in accordance with the promissory note that was given for the 
payment of the property. 
30. LaMar Duncan acted as attorney for plaintiff and 
defendant, and the parties relied upon his representations 
concernina the creation of the guardianship in lieu of the trust. 
FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
31. Prior to the creation of the guardianship, Mr. Duncan 
reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement in behalf of plaintiff. 
32. The closing was held before the guardianship proceeding 
was initiated. 
33. At the time of closing, a deed was not executed by 
plaintiff to the buyer Scott Investment Corporation. 
34. After the appointment of the guardian, the plaintiff 
and not the guardian executed a deed to the property to Scott 
Investment Corporation on March 23, 1971, and on March 24, 1971 
Scott Investment Corporation conveyed the property to defendant. 
35. A petition to approve the execution of a deed was not 
submitted to the court. 
36. There is no statutory provision that precludes a 
guardian of a ward selling to a guardian, but the Court does not 
condone or look upon with favor when a guardian purchases from a 
ward. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Court concludes as followsi 
1. The plaintiff was intelligent, educated and had the 
ability to understand the terms of the sale despite her mental 
illness. 
2. The appointment of a guardian following the sale was 
not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale. 
FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
3. The defendant did not take advantage of plaintiff; 
exercise undue influence over her; or perpetrate a fraud upon her 
by purchasing plaintiff's property. 
4. The plaintiff did not lack the mental capacity to enter 
into a legally binding contract. 
5. The failure to obtain court approval for the execution 
of a deed after the guardian was appointed did not void the deed. 
6. The plaintiff had the contractual capacity to enter 
into a legally binding contract. 
7. That plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action 
against defendant, 
The Court refers the parties to defendant's Memorandum for 
the case law, 
Defendant's counsel shall prepare the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree accordingly. 
Dated this ( 1 day of March, 1988. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this ( I day of March, 1988: 
Dean Becker, Esq. 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Timothy C. Houpt 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David J. Jordan 
Attorney for J. Russell Scott 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, ) AND JUDGMENT 
vs. ) PROBATE NO. 57693 
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, ) 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter was tried on the 12th day of 
January, 1988. Plaintiff was present and represented by Brian 
M. Barnard and Timothy C. Houpt. Defendant was present and 
represented by David J. Jordan. The Court heard the testimony 
of witnesses and admitted documentary evidence. At the 
conclusion of the trial the Court advised counsel that closing 
arguments would be continued to a future date. On the 29th day 
of January, 1988, counsel for the respective parties made their 
closing arguments. The Court took the matter under 
advisement. The Court having had an opportunity to review its' 
notes, the Memoranda on file, the exhibits admitted, and the 
pertinent authorities cited, now renders its decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are first cousins who 
inherited real property located near the mouth of Big 
Cottonwood Canyon from their uncle. 
2. Defendant inherited 400 acres and plaintiff 
inherited 60 acres from their uncle. 
3. Plaintiff, during the 1960's, sold 15 acres to 
defendant. 
4. Plaintiff in 1968, entered into a trust agreement 
with her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes Freebairn 
for the purpose of developing their respective properties. 
5. Samuel Freebairn encumbered the land by a 
mortgage in favor of Beehive State Bank for $50,000,00. 
6. Samuel Freebairn died on July 30, 1969, and as a 
result of his death Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop the 
property or make the payments on the mortgage or pay the 
property taxes, 
7. The 1968 trust agreement was prepared by Herbert 
Halliday, attorney for Security Title Co., which was charged 
with the administration of the trust, 
8. There was no evidence presented that at the time 
of the creation of the 1968 trust agreement plaintiff was not 
competent to contract. 
9. The 1968 trust was terminated by plaintiff and 
Agnes Freebairn in March of 1971. Mr. Halliday handled the 
termination, but did not make a determination as to plaintiff's 
mental status at that time. 
10. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn, facing the risk of 
losing the property which was the subject matter of the 1968 
trust agreement agreed to sell the property. 
11. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn contracted with LeR 
Burton, a real estate agent, to sell the property. Mr. Burton 
listed the property for sale in the multiple listing book, and 
advertised the same in a newspaper of state-wide circulation. 
12. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn established an 
asking price, and sought out defendant to purchase the property. 
13. Plaintiff on January 13, 1971 entered into an 
Earnest Money Agreement with Scott Investment Corporation, 
owned by defendant, for the sale and purchase of approximately 
25 acres for $65,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per 
annum. 
14. Plaintiff had transacted a number of loans and 
sales of parcels of land prior to this particular transaction, 
and there was no evidence presented that she didn't understand 
the nature of those transactions. 
15. The Earnest Money Agreement provided, among other 
things, that the proceeds were to be: 
"placed in a protective trust for the purpose of 
safeguarding the assets and welfare of the seller 
to the extent that the income she needs for 
personal welfare cannot be preyed upon by others." 
16. Prior to the closing LaMar Duncan, attorney, was 
consulted by plaintiff and defendant regarding the creation of 
a trust for the sale proceeds. Mr. Duncan recommended that 
instead of a trust, a guardianship be created. 
17. The closing for the sale of the property took 
place on March 1, 1971. 
18. The guardianship was created and defendant was 
named guardian for plaintiff on March 22, 1971. 
19. On March 23, 1971 plaintiff executed a warranty 
deed in favor of Scott Investment Corporation, and retained no 
security interest in the property despite the fact that 
defendant was to make monthly payments for the purchase of the 
property. 
20. In January of 1972 defendant exchanged the land 
acquired from plaintiff in a four-way trade. In the exchange, 
the defendant received the land under or around the Metro 
Building located at 431 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
having a value of $76,000.00. 
21. The property sold by plaintiff to Scott 
Investment Corporation, who in turn conveyed the property to 
defendant was exchanged for the Metro Building property. 
22. The party who obtained the property, formerly 
owned by plaintiff, in the four-way exchange sold the subject 
property within two years for $6,000.00 per acre. 
23. Real estate values increased dramatically 
immediately after the subject sale. 
24. The land sold by plaintiff to defendant in 1971 
was retroactively appraised by two appraisers for this lawsuit 
and they established values for the property in 1971 as being 
$3,100.00 and $5,500.00 per acre. The Court finds that the 
value established by defendants' appraiser more accurately 
reflects the fair market value of the property at the time of 
the sale from plaintiff to defendant. Defendant's expert 
further testified that if the sales price of the subject 
property at the time of the creation of the 1968 trust 
agreement were considered as an additional comparable, the 
appraised value would be lower than $3,100.00 per acre. The 
Court finds that the sales price paid by defendant to plaintiff 
was a fair price and consistent with the fair market value at 
the time. 
25. Plaintiff during her adult years had transacted a 
number of land transactions, conducted her own business 
affairs, attended college, was employed by the Deseret News, 
Salt Lake Tribune and Brigham Young University. 
26. Plaintiff's expert diagnosed plaintiff as a 
paranoid schizophrenic, Defendant's expert diagnosed plaintiff 
as suffering from a dilusional paranoid disorder, 
27. Plaintiff is intelligent and educated, and could 
and did factually understand the sale of property. Plaintiff 
was competent to sell the property to defendant. 
28. Plaintiff is not a good manager of her personal 
finances, but she has personally managed her finances, even 
though the court had appointed a guardian for her. 
29. Plaintiff received all of the payments from 
defendant in accordance with the promissory note that was given 
for the payment of the property. 
30. LaMar Duncan acted as attorney for plaintiff and 
defendant, and the parties relied upon his representations 
concerning the creation of the guardianship in lieu of a trust. 
31. Prior to the creation of the guardianship, Mr. 
Duncan reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement in behalf of 
plaintiff. 
32. The closing was held before the guardianship 
proceeding was initiated, 
33. At the time of closing, a deed was not executed 
by plaintiff to the buyer Scott Investment Corporation. 
34. After the appointment of the guardian, the 
plaintiff and not the guardian executed a deed to the property 
to Scott Investment Corporation on March 23, 1971, and on March 
24, 1971 Scott Investment Corporation conveyed the property to 
defendant. 
35. A petition to approve the execution of a deed was 
not submitted to the court 
36. There is no statutory provision that precludes a 
guardian of a ward selling to a guardian, but the Court does 
not look upon with favor when a guardian purchases from a ward. 
LAW 
I. Contracts by Persons Subject to Guardianships are not 
Void. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the appointment 
of a guardian is only prima facie evidence of incompetence to 
contract and may be rebutted. In Hometown Finance Corp. v. 
Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962), the Court held: 
[T]he appointment of a guardian is prima facie 
evidence of the incompetency of the ward, but 
. . . such prima facie [evidence] may be rebutted 
by evidence which shows that the ward was 
competent to understandingly manage his business 
affairs and enter into contracts at a time of 
making the alleged contract in question. 
Accord, Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519, 
522-23 (10th Cir. I960). In order to determine a person's 
competency to contract, courts look to see if the person's 
mental faculties were so deficient or impaired at the time the 
contract was made that the person lacked the power to 
comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature, and its 
probable consequences. Hatch v, Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 
433, 438 (1914) The Court in Brisacher, supra, held that a 
person may meet the statutory definition of the mental 
condition necessary to establish a guardianship and 
nevertheless be competent to contract under the Hatch test. 
As the Court in Brisacher held, "[T]he recognition by a court 
in Utah that a person is incompetent to manage his affairs 
[under U.C.A. 75-13-20] is not tantamount to an adjudication 
that he is incapable of intelligently entering a contract." 
Brisacher, 277 F.2d at 522. As stated above, the Court finds 
that plaintiff was competent. 
II. The Transaction was Fair and Therefore Valid. 
In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 
1984), the Court held that the existence of a confidential 
relationship between contracting parties does not make the 
contract void. The Court stated: 
When a confidential relationship exists between 
parties, and a transaction occurs that benefits 
the one in whom the confidence is placed, a 
presumption arises that the transaction is 
unfair. This shifts to the benefiting party the 
burden to persuade the Court that there is no 
fraud or undue influence exercised toward the 
other. 
The principle applied by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Cunningham v. Cunningham is followed in many other 
jurisdictions. For example, in Egr v. Egr, 170 Or. 1, 131 
P.2d 198, 201 (1942) the Court held: 
The law seems to be well settled where one 
accepts a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
to another as that of a guardian and ward . . . 
where the donee or grantee is supposed to 
exercise an unusual and commanding influence over 
the grantor, courts will set aside the conveyance 
unless the grantee can show that the transaction 
was fair and without fraud or undue influence. 
See also Matter of Estate of Nelson, 134 Ariz. 439, 657 P.2d 
437, 430 (1982); Lindsay v. Gibson, 635 P.2d 331, 332-33 
(Okla. 1981); In Re Guardianship of Chandos, 18 Ariz. 583, 504 
P.2d, 524, 526 (1972); Nelson v. Gossage, 152 Kan. 805, 107 
P.2d 682, 684-85 (1940). In this jurisdiction the effect of 
the fiduciary relationship is not to invalidate the contract 
but rather to shift the burden to the fiduciary to prove that 
the transaction was fair and without fraud or undue influence. 
Defendant has met that burden. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Court concludes as follows: 
1. The plaintiff was intelligent, educated and had 
the ability to understand the terms of the sale despite her 
mental illness. 
2. The appointment of a guardian following the sale 
was not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale. 
3. The defendant did not take advantage of 
plaintiff; exercise undue influence over her; or perpetrate a 
fraud upon her by purchasing plaintiff's property. 
4. The plaintiff did not lack the mental capacity to 
enter into a legally binding contract, 
5. The failure to obtain court approval for the 
execution of a deed after the guardian was appointed did not 
void the deed. 
6. The plaintiff had the contractual capacity to 
enter into a legally binding contract, 
7. That plaintiff have judgment of no cause of 
action against defendant. 
Accordingly it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed 
that plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action against 
defendant. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this y < day of April, 1988. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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